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Abstract
A social welfare rule g selects a complete asymmetric binary relation on a set of
alternatives A as a function of voter preferences over A. Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem show that all social welfare
rules fail to satisfy a small number of seeminly innocuous properties when voter
preferences are unrestricted. In this paper, we propose several techniques for
quantifying the degree of these failures for simple majority rule and Borda’s
rule. In addition, we develop a matricial framework for analyzing social welfare
rules. We believe that the tools and methods proposed have significant potential
in future analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Social choice theory is often characterized as a field of impossibility
theorems. Indeed, its inception was largely tied to Arrow’s Theorem
[2], which demonstrated the impossibility of constructing a voting
mechanism that satisfies a number of seemingly innocuous proper-
ties. Since then numerous other impossibility theorems have been
proved, and conditions have been identified under which possibility
theorems may be obtained.
The axiomatic approach to possibility and impossibility theorems
is largely a question of existence: does there exist a voting rule that
is well-behaved for some large family of voting situations; or, do
there exist voting situations in which all voting rules are poorly
behaved? Although such inquiries have significantly advanced the
theoretical underpinnings of the field, they often fail to provide in-
sight for practical voting situations.
There are many real-world situations in which group decisions
need to be made, and the results of social choice theory offer little
practical advice for how such decisions should be made. Theory
might tell us, for example, that a voting rule will be subject to
manipulation; what we desire to know is the degree to which it
can be manipulated. Theory might also tell us that a particular
voting rule, though attractive in many ways, is undesirable in certain
settings. What we attempt to quantify how often such settings
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occur, and how poorly the rules can perform.
This paper attempts to address this gap between theoretical (of-
ten existence) results and more practical measures of performance.
In particular, we focus on two common voting rules: simple majority
rule and Borda’s rule. The first is known to fail to produce useful
outcomes, while the second is known to be subject to strategic ma-
nipulation. We attempt to quantify in certain way both of these
failures.
This paper contains few concrete results. As a relatively unex-
plored field, there was much groundwork to set in place and little
foundation of existing results on which to build. To this end, we
have developed a number of tools that we believe will be of extreme
importance to the further development of this field. We have uncov-
ered a number of difficult and important questions, and hope that
the investment we have made in developing new tools will prove
valuable to future researchers.
Chapter 1 begins with a qualitative introduction to the field of so-
cial choice theory. Section 1.2 introduces the standard social choice
notation and definitions in addition to new notation and a number
of alternative definitions developed specifically for this project. Sec-
tion 1.3 introduces an algorithm for creating vector representations
of standard social choice objects, and contains a cursory discussion
of the benefits of such a representation.
In Chapter 2 we begin with an introduction to generalized ma-
jority rules and show that these rules display a number of desirable
properties. Section 2.2 focuses on a particularly famous generalized
majority rule: simple majority rule. In this section, we illustrate
the failures of simple majority rule by means of an example. In Sec-
tion 2.3 we present a linear algebraic proof that all logically possible
voting outcomes can be obtained by applying majority rule to the
appropriate group of voters. We also present some known results,
and show that no finite number of voters is sufficient to obtain all
logically possible voting outcomes above some threshold number of
alternatives.
Chapter 3 introduces generalized Borda rules, and shows that
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these rules also display a number of desirable properties; we also
show their most pronounced failures. Section 3.2 introduces the
standard Borda rule (also known simply as Borda’s rule). In Sec-
tion 3.3 we discuss strategic manipulation of Borda’s rule and in-
troduce a formal measure of manipulability. In Section 3.3, exact
manipulation measures are presented for small cases and a computer
simulation is developed for estimating manipulability when there are
more voters or alternatives.
In Chapter 4 we introduce a matricial approach to social choice
theory. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 recast generalized majority rules and
Borda rules in the matricial framework. Section 4.3 introduces Per-
ron’s rule, a social choice rule that is defined solely in terms of
matrices.
Finally, the appendices contain simulation and computation out-
put, as well as source code. A large amount of data was produced
through this research, and we believe that future research may ben-
efit from access to these data.
1.1 Social Choice Theory
There are many everyday situations in which a group of individuals
must make a collective decision: an academic department electing a
chair, a community deciding which public project to fund, a family
choosing a restaurant at which to eat dinner. Similarly, there are
situations in which a group must collectively order a set of alter-
natives, such as candidates for a job or college applicants. Social
choice theory provides an axiomatic framework in which to analyze
such decision processes.
The field of social choice theory is primarily concerned with the
formal analysis of collective decision-making processes. The roots
of the field date to 1785, when the French philosopher and mathe-
matician Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Con-
dorcet published his Essays on the Application of Analysis to the
Probability of Majority Decisions [3]. Among other topics the essay
introduced the Condorcet method, a formulation of majority rule,
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and illustrated Condorcet’s Voting Paradox, which states that group
preferences may be intransitive even when individual preferences are
not.
The field was founded in its modern form by the work of Ken-
neth Arrow in 1951, and was propelled forward by early landmark
results, including Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [2] and its refine-
ments. Arrow’s theorem sets forth a number of natural properties
we might desire a decision-making rule to possess, then shows that
the properties are incompatible. We give a qualitative version of
Arrow’s theorem here; a formal version follows in Section 1.2.
Theorem 1.1.1 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem). Suppose there
are at least two voters and at least three alternatives. Then no de-
terministic voting rule that produces a linear ordering of the alter-
natives as a function of voter preferences can simultaneously exhibit
all of the following properties:
1. The rule is defined for all specifications of voter preferences.
2. There is no individual for whom the societal ranking always
corresponds with his or her individual ranking.
3. Regardless of voter preferences, the introduction (or removal)
of a single alternative does not change the relative ranking of
the existing (or remaining) alternatives.
4. If a voter promotes an alterative in his or her individual rank-
ing, the alternative can never be demoted in the societal rank-
ing.
5. Every possible ranking of the alternatives is attainable as the
societal ranking of some set of voter preferences.
Another famous result was developed in independently by Gib-
bard [6] and Satterthwaite [17]. The result is closely related to
Arrow’s theorem; Reny [15] provides a single proof that yields both
results. Again, we present the theorem informally.
Theorem 1.1.2 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem). Suppose there
are at least two voters and at least three alternatives, and that voters
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are allowed to have any preferences over the set of alternatives. Then
one of the following must be true for any deterministic voting rule
that selects one alternative as a function of the voter preferences:
1. One of the voters is a dictator, so the rule always chooses from
that voter’s most-preferred set of alternatives.
2. There is some alternative that is never selected by the rule.
3. There exist situations in which an individual voter can bene-
fit from misrepresenting his or her preferences over the set of
alternatives.
Social choice theory therefore provides a framework in which col-
lective decision-making processes can be analyzed axiomatically. A
social choice (similarly, welfare) rule is a mechanism for choosing
an alternative (ranking of alternatives) as a function of individual
preferences. Within the field, there are multitudes of identified prop-
erties a given rule might display, much analysis has been devoted to
identifying situations in which there exist rules that possess “good”
properties.
The focus of this paper is to investigate and partially quantify the
occurrence of “bad” properties in rules that are otherwise appeal-
ing. In the next section, we establish the notation and definitions
necessary for this analysis.
1.2 Notation and Definitions
Let V be the set of voters indexed by the natural numbers, V =
{1, . . . , m}. Let A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of alternatives. Unless
explicitly stated, we impose no assumptions on V and A except that
each is nonempty, and m,n <∞.
Let LW (A) denote the set of weak linear orders on the set A and
let LS(A) denote the set of strict linear orders on A. Each voter
has a preference order over the alternatives in A that is a member
of LW (A); we will occasionally further restrict voter preferences to
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LS(A). Clearly, LS(A) ⊂ LW (A). These axiomatic assumptions
coincide with out intuitive understanding of individual preferences:
• Complete: For all alternative pairs (ai, aj), individuals have
some preference relation (potentially indifference) between the
pair.
• Transitive: For all alternative triples (ai, aj , ak), no individual
would prefer simultaneously ai to aj , aj to ak, and ak to ai.
• Asymmetric Part: There exist alternative pairs (ai, aj) for which
individuals strictly prefer alternative ai to aj.
• Symmetric Part: There exist alternative pairs (ai, aj) for which
individuals are indifferent between the alternatives ai and aj .
A profile p is a mapping that assigns a preference ordering to
each voter. We let p(i) indicate voter i’s preference ordering at
profile p. When voter preference orderings are restricted to LS(A),
let pk(i) indicate voter i’s kth most-preferred alternative at profile p.
When voter preferences are elements of LW (A), let pk(i) indicate the
kth ranked set of alternatives (where voter i is indifferent between
all alternatives within the set). Since there are a finite number of
alternatives, p1(i) is nonempty for all profiles p and voters i; for
k = 2, . . . , n it may be that pk(i) = ∅.
Example 1.2.1. Let A = {a1, a2, a3} be the set of alternatives, p be
a profile, and i be a voter such that
p(i) = (a1 ∼ a2 ≻ a3).
Then
p1(i) = {a1, a2}, p2(i) = {a3}, and p3(i) = ∅.
The notation ai ≻p(k) aj is used to indicate that individual k
prefers alternative ai to alternative aj at profile p. Similarly, ai ∼p(k)
aj indicates that voter k is indifferent over the pair (ai, aj) at profile
p.
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Example 1.2.2. Suppose that A = {a1, a2, a3}, and that at profiles
p and q (respectively) voter k has the preference orderings
p(k) = (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3), q(k) = (a1 ∼ a2 ≻ a3).
These preference orderings indicate that at p voter k prefers alter-
native a1 to a2 and a3, and alternative a2 to a3. At profile q voter k
prefers alternative a1 and a2 to a3, but is indifferent between a1 and
a2.
Therefore, we have that p ∈ LS(A)
m ⊂ LW (A)
m and q ∈ LW (A)
m\
LS(A)
m, where m is the total number of voters.
We can imagine a profile in the form of a 2–dimensional array, in
which each column represents a particular voter’s preference order-
ing. When voter preferences are in LS(A), the array has dimension
n × m; for convention we will retain these dimensions even when
voter preferences contain indifference, and could be visualized in a
smaller array. For clarity, we will generally append a row to the top
of the profile matrix to indicate the voter to whom each column is
assigned. The following example illustrates the use of this notation.
Example 1.2.3. Let V = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a1, a2, a3}. Then the
profile
p =


1 2 3
a1 a2 a1
a2 a1 a3
a3 a3 a2


indicates that p(1) = (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3) and p(3) = (a1 ≻ a3 ≻
a2). Furthermore, we have p1(2) = a2 and p3(3) = a2. Since all
preferences are strict, we have p ∈ LS(A)
3.
Next consider the profile
q =


1 2 3
a1 ∼ a2 a2 a1
a3 a1 ∼ a3 a3
a2

 ,
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where q(1) = (a1 ∼ a2 ≻ a3), q(2) = (a2 ≻ a2 ∼ a3), and q(3) =
(a1 ≻ a3 ≻ a2). Since voters 1 and 2 are indifferent over some pairs
of alternatives, we have q ∈ LW (A)
3 \ LS(A)
3.
We use the notation Vp(ai ≻ aj) to indicate the subset of voters
preferring alternative ai to aj at profile p. Similarly, we use Vp(ai ∼
aj) to indicate the subset of voters preferring alternative ai to aj at
profile p. In the above example, we had Vp(a1 ≻ a3) = {1, 3} and
Vp(a1 ∼ a2) = {1}. For all ai, aj ∈ A and all profiles p ∈ LW (A)
m,
the sets Vp(ai ≻ aj), Vp(ai ∼ aj), Vp(aj ≻ ai) form a partition of the
set V .
A social welfare rule is a function g : ℘ −→ R(A), where ℘
denotes some profile space and R(A) is the set of all complete anti-
symmetric relations on A, with asymmetric part ≻ and symmetric
part ∼. For our purposes, we will assume that either ℘ = LW (A)
m
or ℘ = LS(A)
m. We use the notation gk(p) to indicate the set of
alternatives ranking kth in the societal preference outcome g(p). As
before, g1(p) is always nonempty although gk(p) may be empty for
k = 2, . . . , n.
Example 1.2.4. Let A = {a1, a2, a3}, p, q ∈ LW (A)
m, and g be a
social welfare rule with
g(p) = (a1 ∼ a2 ∼ a3), g(q) = (a1 ≻ a2 ∼ a3).
Then g1(p) = A and g2(p) = ∅. Also g1(q) = {a1}, g2(q) = {a2, a3},
and g3(q) = ∅.
There are several properties of interest that an arbitrary social
welfare rule may possess. We next define a number of these proper-
ties.
Definition 1.2.5 (Dictatorship). A social welfare rule g is dictato-
rial if and only if ∃i ∈ V such that ∀p ∈ ℘, g(p) = p(i). We call
such an individual i the dictator. A rule is non-dictatorial if and
only if it is not dictatorial.
Definition 1.2.6 (Manipulability). A social welfare rule g is ma-
nipulable if and only if ∃ p, q ∈ ℘ and i ∈ V such that p(j) = q(j)
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for all j 6= i and g1(p) 6= g1(q). A social choice rule is strategy-proof
if and only if it is not manipulable.
If a social welfare rule g is manipulable as above, we say that
individual i can manipulate at profile q via the preference ordering
p(i) (or, symmetrically, can manipulate at profile p via the prefer-
ence ordering q(i)). We note that this definition of manipulation
differs from the definition traditionally used in the literature.
Definition 1.2.7 (Unanimity). A social welfare rule g is unanimous
if and only if whenever ∃p ∈ ℘ and ai ∈ A such that ai ∈ p1(j) for
all j ∈ V , then ai ∈ g1(p).
In particular, when all voters share a single most-preferred alter-
native a unanimous social welfare rule must rank that alternative as
the single most-preferred in the societal preference outcome.
Definition 1.2.8 (Anonymity). For a profile p ∈ ℘ and any per-
mutation σV of the voters in V , define σV (p) to be the induced per-
mutation on p. Then a social welfare rule g is anonymous if and
only if g(p) = g(σV (p)).
We will next show that an anonymity and dictatorship are in-
compatible.
Lemma 1.2.9. If g be an anonymous social welfare rule, then g is
non-dictatorial.
Proof. Let p be a profile at which each voter’s preference ordering
is distinct; that is p(i) 6= p(j) for all i, j ∈ V (i 6= j). Suppose that
g is an anonymous and dictatorial social welfare rule, with voter k
the dictator. Let σV be any permutation on the set of voters such
that σV (k) 6= k.
Since g is anonymous, g(p) = g(σV (p)). Moreover, since g has
dictator k, g(p) = p(k) and g(σV (p)) = p(σV (k)). However, p(k) 6=
p(σV (k)), by construction.
Since this is a contradiction, there does not exist a social welfare
rule g that is both anonymous and dictatorial.
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We next introduce a dual property of anonymity, for which social
welfare rules are invariant in the natural way to permutations of the
alternatives.
Definition 1.2.10 (Neutrality). Let σA be a permutation of the
alternatives in A and σA(p) be the induced permutation on p. Then
a social welfare g is neutral if and only if σA ◦ g(p) = g(σA(p)).
Admittedly the σ notation in the preceding two definitions is
somewhat abusive. Nevertheless the concepts are sufficiently clear
that the abuse is preferable to the introduction of additional nota-
tion. For clarity, the following example illustrates permutations of
the voters and of the alternatives.
Example 1.2.11. Let V = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a1, a2, a3}. Let σV =
(1, 3, 2) be a permutation on the set of voters that relabels voter 1 as
3, 3 as 2, and 2 as 1. Then for
p =


1 2 3
a1 a2 a1
a2 a1 a3
a3 a3 a2

 , σV (p) =


1 2 3
a1 a1 a2
a3 a2 a1
a2 a3 a3

 .
Next, let σA = (a3, a1, a2) be a permutation on the set of alterna-
tives that relabels alternative a3 as a1, a1 as a2, and a2 as a3. Then
for
p =


1 2 3
a1 a2 a1
a2 a1 a3
a3 a3 a2

 , σA(p) =


1 2 3
a2 a3 a2
a3 a2 a1
a1 a1 a3

 .
Definition 1.2.12 (Monotonicity). Let g be a social welfare rule,
V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters and A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set
of alternatives. Let p, q ∈ LW (A)
m be profiles such that there exists
i ∈ V and ak ∈ A such that p(j) = q(j) for all j 6= i and
{aℓ ∈ A : ak ≻p(i) aℓ} ⊂ {aℓ ∈ A : ak ≻q(i) aℓ}.
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Then g is monotonic if and only if
{aℓ ∈ A : ak ≻g(p) aℓ} ⊂ {aℓ ∈ A : ak ≻g(q) aℓ}.
Qualitatively, monotonicity requires that a voter cannot cause
the demotion of an alternative in the societal preference outcome
by promoting the alternative in his or her preference ordering.
The previous definitions have referred to the behavior of a so-
cial welfare rule over a fixed domain with a fixed number of voters
and alternatives. The following property concerns the behavior of a
social welfare rule with respect to varying numbers of individuals.
Definition 1.2.13 (Consistency). Let g be a social welfare rule, A
be the set of alternatives, V1 and V2 be disjoint sets of voters, p1 a
profile on V1 and A and p2 a profile on V2 and A, with g1(p1) =
g1(p2). Let p be the profile on V = V1 ∪ V2 such that p(i) = p1(i)
for all i ∈ V1 and p(i) = p2(i) for all i ∈ V2. Then g is consistent if
and only if g1(p) = g1(p1) = g1(p2).
Again, we define a dual property which describes the behavior of
social welfare rules with respect to varying numbers of alternatives.
Definition 1.2.14 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). Let
g be a social choice welfare rule, and let V be the set of voters and
A be the set of alternatives. Furthermore, define A+ = A ∪ {an+1}
and for any profile p on the alternatives in A, define p+ such that
∀ k ∈ N and ∀ ai, aj ∈ A, ai ≻p(k) aj implies that ai ≻p+(k) aj.
Then g satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if and
only if ∀ ai, aj ∈ A, ai ≻g(p) aj implies that ai ≻g(p+) aj.
Intuitively, IIA requires that the introduction of new alternatives
cannot change the relative ranking of other alternatives in a societal
preference outcome. A classic anecdote illustrating a violation of IIA
was proposed by Columbia University philosophy professor Sidney
Morgenbesser:
After finishing dinner, I decided to order dessert. The
waitress told me there were two choices: apple pie and
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blueberry pie. I ordered the apple pie. After a few minutes
the waitress returned and said that they also have cherry
pie at which point I replied “In that case I’ll have the
blueberry pie.”
In later chapters we will see examples of social welfare rules that
satisfy IIA and social welfare rules that do not.
Of the above properties, a number are considered desirable for
normative reasons. Unanimity, anonymity, neutrality, and consis-
tency appeal to universal ideas of fairness and equal treatment.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives if considered by many an
equally natural requirement for a social welfare rule, although it
is considerably more controversial than the other properties under
consideration. With the notation and definitions we have developed,
we next restate Arrow’s Theorem more precisely.
Theorem 1.2.15 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem). Let V be the
set of voters and A be the set of alternatives, with |V | = m ≥ 2 and
|A| = n ≥ 3. Let g : ℘ −→ LW (A) be a social welfare rule. Then g
must fail to satisfy one of the following properties:
1. The domain ℘ = LW (A)
m.
2. g is non-dictatorial.
3. g is consistent.
4. g is monotonic.
5. g is onto.
The above definitions and notation are largely standard to the so-
cial choice literature. In some cases (as mentioned) we have chosen
to use alternative definitions for convenience, and have introduced
our own notation for some concepts. In the next section, we intro-
duce a new procedure that we believe has beneficial implications for
research in social choice theory.
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1.3 Alternative Representations of Voter
and Societal Preferences
We next introduce a procedure that allows for voter preference or-
derings and societal preference outcome to be encoded into a simple
mathematical object: a vector of integers. By using a vector rep-
resentation, we allow for the use of standard geometric and linear
algebraic tools. In Chapter 4 we will further investigate the many
advantages of a matricial approach.
Given a voter preference ordering p(ℓ) on the set alternatives
A = {a1, . . . , an}, we can encode the voter’s preferences in a ±1/0-
vector in R(
n
2) via the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1.3.1 (Ternary Representation). Given a voter prefer-
ence ordering p(ℓ) we generate v(ℓ) ∈ R(
n
2) by
1. Fix an ordering of the alternatives, e.g. (a1, a2, . . . , an).
2. Fix an ordering of all
(
n
2
)
unique pairings of alternatives, e.g.
x1 = (a1, a2), x2 = (a1, a3), . . . , xn−1 = (a1, an), xn = (a2, a3), . . . .
3. For xk = (ai, aj),
(a) If ai ≻p(ℓ) aj, set v(/l)k = 1.
(b) If ai ∼p(ℓ) aj, set v(/l)k = 0.
(c) If ai ≺p(ℓ) aj, set v(/l)k = −1.
This algorithm assigns to each voter preference ordering a unique
±1/0-vector in R(
n
2). However, when voter preference orderings are
elements of LW (A), this algorithm does not produce a 1–1 corre-
spondence, as the following example illustrates.
Example 1.3.2. Let v = (1,−1, 1) ∈ R(
3
2). If we attempt to reverse
our algorithm to generate a voter preference ordering for some voter
ℓ, we arrive at
p(ℓ) = (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a1).
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Clearly p(ℓ) 6∈ LW (A) since it is not a weak linear order (it contains
a cycle).
Algorithm 1.3.1 can also be used to create a vector representa-
tion of a societal preference outcome g(p) by replacing p(ℓ) with
g(p). Whether or not the algorithm produces a 1–1 correspondence
between societal preference outcomes and ±1/0-vectors in R(
n
2) de-
pends on the social welfare rule being used.
In addition to the ±1/0-vector representation, societal prefer-
ence outcomes can be naturally represented by directed graphs (di-
graphs). We next present an algorithm for creating a digraph rep-
resentation of a societal preference outcome, g(p).
Algorithm 1.3.3. Given a societal preference outcome g(p) we gen-
erate G(A, g(p)) by
1. Fix an ordering of the alternatives, e.g. (a1, a2, . . . , an).
2. Assign each alternative to a node of the graph.
3. For all alternative pairs (ai, aj), add a directed arc from ai to
aj if and only if ai ≻g(p) aj.
We next present a concrete example.
Example 1.3.4. Let A = {a1, a2, a3} be the set of alternatives, g
be a social welfare rule, and p be a profile such that g(p) = (a1 ≻
a2 ≻ a3). Then by Algorithm 1.3.3 be can represent g(p), as shown
in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Digraph Representation of Societal Preference Outcome
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Graphical representations will be of extreme importance for vi-
sualizing social preference outcomes. By assumption we have re-
stricted voter preferences to be linear orders, which permit a num-
ber of natural visual representations including lists (potentially with
ties). As we shall see in the next chapter, societal preference out-
comes need not be linear orders, even when voter preferences are.
In this case, lists are no longer appropriate vehicles for visual rep-
resentations.
When voter preference orderings are restricted to LS(A), we will
sometimes wish to employ a binary vector representation rather than
a ternary representation. The algorithm is presented below.
Algorithm 1.3.5 (Binary Representation). Given a voter prefer-
ence ordering p(ℓ) ∈ LS(A) we generate v(ℓ) ∈ R
(n2) by
1. Fix an ordering of the alternatives, e.g. (a1, a2, . . . , an).
2. Fix an ordering of all
(
n
2
)
unique pairings of alternatives, e.g.
x1 = (a1, a2), x2 = (a1, a3), . . . , xn−1 = (a1, an), xn = (a2, a3), . . . .
3. For xk = (ai, aj),
(a) If ai ≻p(ℓ) aj, set v(/l)k = 1.
(b) Else, set v(/l)k = 0.
15
Chapter 2
Majority Rule
We next formally introduce a social welfare rule that is well-known
outside the literature: simple majority rule. We begin with a dis-
cussion of generalized majority rules and their properties. We next
introduce simple majority rule, and compare it with other general-
ized majorities rules. We follow with a known result and original
linear algebraic proof that is a 1–1 correspondence between simple
majority rule societal preference outcomes and ±1/0-vectors; refine-
ments of this result are also presented. Finally, we investigate the
distribution of societal outcomes and present some cursory findings.
2.1 Generalized Majority Rules
Define a generalized majority rule to be the social welfare rule gMγ :
℘ −→ R(A) such that ∀ai, aj ∈ A,
ai ≻gMγ (p) aj ⇔ |Vp(ai ≻ aj)| > γm,
and
ai 6≻gMγ (p) aj and aj 6≻gMγ (p) ai ⇒ ai ∼gMγ (p) aj ,
for a fixed γ ∈ [m
2
, 1]. That is, alternative ai is preferred to alterna-
tive aj in the societal preference outcome g(p) if and only if more
than γm of the voters prefer ai to aj at profile p. If ai is not pre-
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ferred to aj in g(p) and aj is not preferred to ai in g(p), then g(p)
is indifferent between ai and aj . By construction, it is clear that for
all profiles p, gMγ (p) is a complete antisymmetric relation on A.
As we shall next prove, generalized majority rules have a number
of desirable properties.
Lemma 2.1.1. Generalized majority rules are unanimous, anony-
mous (and thus non-dictatorial), neutral, consistent, and satisfy in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. Let V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters and A = {a1, . . . , an}
be the number of alternatives.
Suppose that at profile p there exists ai ∈ A such that p1(k) = ai
for all k ∈ V . Then Vp(ai ≻ aj) = V so that |Vp(ai ≻ aj)| = m > γm
for any γ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore alternative ai is the unique most-
preferred alternative in gMγ (p) so generalized majority rules have
the unanimity property.
Next let σV be some permutation of the voters. At any profile
p and for all i, j, |Vp(ai ≻ aj)| = |VσV (p)(ai ≻ aj)|, although the
composition of the coalitions will differ in the natural way induced
by σV . Since it is only the size of the coalitions that determines the
societal ordering, we therefore have that gMγ (p) = gMγ(σV (p)), so
generalized majority rules are anonymous. Since generalized major-
ity rules are anonymous, they are also non-dictatorial.
Next let σA be some permutation of the names of the alternatives,
and let σA(p) be the permutation of a profile p induced by σA. Then
for all i, j,
|Vp(ai ≻ aj)| = |VσA(p)(σA(ai) ≻ σA(aj))|,
so that σA(gC(p)) = gMγ(σA(p)), so generalized majority rules are
neutral.
Let V1 (|V1| = m1) and V2 (|V2| = m2) be two disjoint sets of
voters. Let profile p1 contain preference orderings for voters in V1,
and profile p2 contain preference orderings for voters in V2. Let p be
the profile on V = V1 ∪ C2 such that p coincides with p1 on V1 and
with p2 on V2. If for some pair i, j, ai ≻gMγ (p1) aj and ai ≻gMγ (p2) aj
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then by definition
|Vp1(ai ≻ aj)| > γm1 and |Vp2(ai ≻ aj)| > γm2
and therefore
|Vp(ai ≻ aj)| = |Vp1(ai ≻ aj)|+|Vp2(ai ≻ aj)| > γm1+γm2 = γ(m1+m2).
Therefore ai ≻gMγ (p) aj, so generalized majority rules are consistent.
Let V = {1, . . . , m} be a set of voters, A = {a1, . . . , an} be a set
of alternatives, p be a profile on the voters in V and the alternatives
in A. Define A+ = A ∪ {an+1} and a profile p
+ such that ∀ k ∈ V
and ∀ ai, aj ∈ A, ai ≻p(k) aj implies that ai ≻p+(k) aj .
Suppose that ai ≻gMγ (p) aj , so that Vp(ai ≻ aj) >
m
2
. By con-
struction, Vp+(ai ≻ aj) = Vp(ai ≻ aj) >
m
2
, so ai ≻gMγ (p+) aj .
Therefore generalized majority rules satisfy independence of irrele-
vant alternatives.
Although all generalized majority rules have the properties of the
previous lemma, there are three particular values of γ that are most
frequently studied: γ = 1
2
, γ = 2
3
, and γ = 1. These values of γ cor-
respond to simple majority rule, 2/3-majority rule and unanimous
rule, respectively. We next consider simple majority rule is greater
detail.
2.2 Simple Majority Rule
We next focus on a particular generalized majority rule known as
simple majority rule, for which γ = 1
2
. As a generalized majority
rule, simple majority rule possesses the properties of the previous
lemma; in particular, it is non-dictatorial, consistent, monotonic,
and onto. From Arrow’s Theorem, there must therefore exist pro-
files at which simple majority rule fails to produce a societal pref-
erence outcome that is a weak linear order. The following example
illustrates such a profile, and is attributed to Condorcet [3].
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Example 2.2.1 (Condorcet’s Voting Paradox). Let V = {1, 2, 3}
and A = {a1, a2, a3} and consider the profile
p =


1 2 3
a1 a3 a2
a2 a1 a3
a3 a2 a1

 .
At this profile, we have
Vp(a1 ≻ a2) = {1, 2}, so |Vp(a1 ≻ a2)| = 2 >
3
2
,
Vp(a2 ≻ a3) = {1, 3}, so |Vp(a2 ≻ a3)| = 2 >
3
2
,
Vp(a3 ≻ a1) = {2, 3}, so |Vp(a3 ≻ a1)| = 2 >
3
2
.
Therefore, the simple majority rule societal preference outcome is
the cycle
gM(P ) = (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a1).
In this example the societal outcome was a simple three-cycle.
With n alternatives, we can construct profiles at which the majority
rule societal outcome contains a k cycle for any 3 ≤ k ≤ n. The
next example illustrates a profile at which the simple majority rule
societal preference outcome contains a number of cycles of various
lengths.
Example 2.2.2. Let V = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a1, a2, a3a4, a5}. Con-
sider the profile
p =


1 2 3
a1 a3 a2
a4 a5 a4
a2 a1 a3
a3 a4 a5
a5 a2 a1


.
It can be verified that the simple majority rule societal outcome con-
tains the three-cycles
a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a1,
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a1 ≻ a4 ≻ a3 ≻ a1,
a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a5 ≻ a2,
a1 ≻ a4 ≻ a3 ≻ a1,
the four-cycles
a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a5 ≻ a1,
a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a1 ≻ a5 ≻ a2,
and the five-cycle
a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a5 ≻ a1 ≻ a4.
Not all generalized majority rules suffer from cyclic societal out-
comes. Abello and Johnson [1] have shown that for γ ≥ 2
3
, gMγ
produces transitive societal outcomes. However, this result should
not be interpreted as unambiguous support for the generalized ma-
jority rule with 2
3
≤ γ ≤ 1 over other generalized majority rules, as
the following example illustrates.
Example 2.2.3. Let V = {1, . . . , 8} be the set of voters and A =
{a1, a2} be the set of alternatives. Consider the profile
p =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2
a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a1 a1 a1

 .
At this profile, we have
gM(2/3)(p) = (a1 ∼ a2), and gM(1/2)(p) = (a1 ≻ a2).
Therefore, the generalized majority rule gM(2/3) produces a societal
outcome that fails to distinguish between the two alternatives al-
though nearly twice as many voters prefer a1 to a2. Here however
simple majority rule gM(1/2) produces a societal preference outcome
in which alternative a1 is most-preferred, and moreover, which is a
strict linear order.
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For a fixed number of alternatives cycles can arise in a simple ma-
jority societal preference outcome in a number of ways. We will say
that a societal preference outcome gM(p) is intransitive if it contains
any cycle of any length. As a matter of practical implementation,
we may wish to distinguish between different types of intransitive
societal preference outcomes. We propose an example.
Example 2.2.4. Let V = {1, 2, 3} be the set of voters and A =
{a1, a2, a3, a4} be the set of alternatives. Consider the profiles
p =


1 2 3
a1 a1 a1
a2 a4 a3
a3 a2 a4
a4 a3 a2

 , q =


1 2 3
a1 a3 a2
a2 a1 a3
a3 a2 a1
a4 a4 a4

 .
The simple majority outcome at profiles p and q are depicted in
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, respectively. From these depictions, we
see that the outcome at profile p is in some sense“nicer,” especially
if we wish to use the societal preference outcome to choose a single
“winning” alternative.
Figure 2.1: Digraph Representation of g(p)
We therefore propose the following measure of transitivity. For
the sake of simplicity, we will assume that there are an odd number
of voters and that voter preferences are restricted to LS(A); this
will ensure that there are no ties in the simple majority rule societal
preference ordering. Then given a simple majority rule societal pref-
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Figure 2.2: Digraph Representation of gM (q)
erence outcome, gM(p), on a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , an},
let vp the binary vector representations of gM(p) given by Algorithm
1.3.5. Moreover, define the set T to be the set of binary vector rep-
resentations of all transitive simple majority rule societal preference
outcomes on the set of alternatives A. Then define τ(p) to be the
transitivity score of gM(p), where
τ(p) = max
t∈T
vp · t(
n
2
) .
By the normalization, 0 ≤ τ(p) ≤ 1 for all profiles p.
Given a profile p and the transitivity score τ(p), we can interpret
τ(p) as the distance from the simple majority rule societal preference
outcome gM(p) to the nearest transitive societal preference outcome.
Example 2.2.5. Let A = {a1, . . . , a4} be the set of alternatives, and
let p be a profile such that gM(p) has binary vector representation
vp = (0 1 1 0 1 1).
Then
τ(p) = max
t∈T
vp · t
6
= 0.667.
As a matter of theory it may be sufficient to know that profiles
such as those in the previous examples exist. However, as a mat-
ter of practical implementation it is important to know how many
such profiles occur or, equivalently, the probability of producing an
intransitive simple majority rule societal preference outcome.
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2.3 Attainability of Societal Outcomes
We have shown that every societal preference ordering on n alterna-
tives has a unique ±1/0-vector representation in R(
n
2). Conversely,
we may ask if an arbitrary ±1/0-vector in R(
n
2) can be a societal
preference outcome.
The problem was first solved by McGarvey[13], who proved the
following equivalent theorem:
Theorem 2.3.1 (McGarvey, 1953). Given an arbitrary preference
pattern over a set of n elements, a group of individuals exists with
strong individual preference orderings such that the group preference
pattern as determined by the method of simple majority decision is
the given preference pattern.
McGarvey employed a constructive proof, which we summarize
here. For continuity, we have adapted our notation to the proof.
Proof. Let p be an arbitrary preference pattern over a set of n el-
ements, {a1, . . . , an}. For each element pair (ai, aj) with ai ≻p aj ,
relabel the remaining alternatives as {a1, . . . , an−2} in any manner.
Then introduce two new voters to the society with preference order-
ings
p(1) = (ai ≻ aj ≻ a1 ≻ a2 ≻ · · · ≻ an−2)
and
p(2) = (ai ≻ aj ≻ an−2 ≻ an−3 ≻ · · · ≻ a1).
By construction, simple majority rule applied to a society consisting
of this pair will produce a societal preference outcome in which
ai ≻ aj , ai ≻ ak for all k 6= i, aj ≻ ak for all k 6= i, j, and for all
ak ∼ aℓ for all k, l 6= i, j.
Therefore, when simple majority rule is applied to the entire soci-
ety, the societal preference outcome will coincide with the preference
pattern p.
We propose a linear algebraic proof of McGarvey’s theorem.
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Proof. Let v ∈ R
(n2)
±1/0 be the vector representation of an arbitrary
preference pattern with fixed ordering of the alternatives a1, a2, . . . , an.
Define the matrix
T =


1 1 1 · · · 1
−1 1 1 · · · 1
−1 −1 1 · · · 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
−1 −1 −1 · · · 1


(n2)×(
n
2)
to be an
(
n
2
)
×
(
n
2
)
matrix with
tij = +1 for i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
and j = 1, . . . , i
tij = −1 for i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
and j = i+ 1, . . . , n
Letting ξ(T ) denote the matrix T after performing the following
elementary row operations:
1. Add Row 1 to Row i, for i = 2, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
;
2. Multiply Row i by 1
2
, for i = 2, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
.
Then we have
ξ(T ) =


1 1 1 · · · 1
0 1 1 · · · 1
0 0 1 · · · 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 1


(n2)×(
n
2)
,
an upper triangular matrix. Clearly, det(ξ(T )) = 1 so that det(T ) 6=
0. Therefore, the column vectors Ti (i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
) form a spanning
set of R(
n
2). Moreover, it can be verified that each column vector
Ti (i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
) corresponds to strict linear order on the set of
alternatives A by considering a partition of the components of a
given vector Ti.
Given Ti, we form a partition P = {ρ1, . . . , ρn−1} of the compo-
nents as follows
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ρ1 = {ti(n2)
}
ρ2 =
{
ti((n2)−1)
, ti((n2)−2)
}
...
...
ρn−2 = {tin, ti(n+1), . . . , ti(2n−3)}
ρn−1 = {ti1, ti2, . . . , ti(n−1)}
so that |ρk| = k. We show that this does indeed produce the desired
partition, as (
n
2
)
=
n(n− 1)
2
=
n−1∑
k=1
k
and clearly ρk ∩ ρm = ∅ for k 6= m. More intuitively, this partition
corresponds to
Ti =


ti1
(ρn−1)
...
ti(n−1)
tin
(ρn−2)
...
ti(2n−3)
...
(ρ2) ti((n2)−1)
ti((n2)−2)
(ρ1) ti(n2)


so that after fixing an ordering of the alternatives, the vector com-
ponents assigned to ρn−i contain the outcomes of all comparisons of
the alternatives (ai, aj), for i = i+ 1, . . . , n.
Starting with the final column vector of T , the following corre-
spondences can also be easily verified:
T(n2)
∼ (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ · · · ≻ an−1 ≻ an),
T(n2)−1
∼ (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ · · · ≻ an ≻ an−1),
T(n2)−2
∼ (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ · · · ≻ an ≻ an−2 ≻ an−1).
Moreover, for any Ti (i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
) the strict linear order of the
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alternatives corresponding to Ti can be found by the following algo-
rithm:
1. Set j =
(
n
2
)
and r = 1.
2. Begin with the natural ordering, p(j + 1) = (a1 ≻ · · · ≻ an).
3. While tij = −1,
• If tij ∈ ρr, create p(j) from p(j + 1) by promoting alterna-
tive an one ranking, e.g. (a1, a4, a2, a3) → (a4, a1, a2, a3).
Decrement j by one unit.
• Else, create p(j) from p(j + 1) by permuting the alterna-
tives ranked below an to the right, e.g. (a1, a4, a2, a3) →
(a1, a4, a3, a2). Increment r and decrement j by one unit.
4. Return p(1).
Since this algorithm produces a permutation of the strict linear order
p
((
n
2
)
+ 1
)
, the resulting p(1) is a strict linear order.
Returning to v ∈ R
(n2)
±1/0, a vector representation of an arbitrary
preference pattern with fixed ordering of the alternatives a1, a2, . . . , an,
we can therefore write v as a linear combination of the columns of
T ,
v =
(n2)∑
i=1
αiTi.
As v and the Ti are rational, we can restrict the coefficients to be
rational. Since our sum is finite we may further restrict the coeffi-
cients to be integer valued by clearing the denominators. Moreover,
we note that given a strict linear order Ti, the vector −Ti corre-
sponds to the reversal of the order of Ti. Therefore, letting
T ′i =
{
−Ti if αi < 0
Ti otherwise
and βi = |αi|,
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we have the representation
v =
(n2)∑
i=1
βiT
′
i , βi ∈ N,
with the following interpretation: Given v, an arbitrary preference
pattern on n alternatives, we may construct a society of β =
∑(n2)
i=1 βi
individuals, with βi individuals holding the preference ordering T
′
i ,
for i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
. By construction, the societal majority rule out-
come of this society is v.
Since Algorithm 1.3.1 applied to any complete antisymmetric re-
lation, we have confirmed McGarvey’s result that an arbitrary pref-
erence relation on n alternatives is a simple majority rule societal
preference outcome of some society. Like McGarvey, we have shown
that this society can be composed of individuals whose preferences
are strict linear orders. We next consider a concrete example of our
results.
Example 2.3.2. Let A{a1, a2, a3, a4} be the set of alternatives. In
this case we have
T =


1 1 1 1 1 1
−1 1 1 1 1 1
−1 −1 1 1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1


on which we may perform elementary matrix operations
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T
t1+ti,i=2,...,6
=⇒


1 1 1 1 1 1
0 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 2 2 2 2
0 0 0 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 2


ti/2,i=2,...,6
=⇒


1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1


= ξ(T )
Furthermore, we note that the preference relations corresponding
to the columns of T are strict linear orders:
T1 = (1, −1, −1, −1, −1, −1) ∼ (a4 ≻ a3 ≻ a1 ≻ a2),
T2 = (1, 1, −1, −1, −1, −1) ∼ (a4 ≻ a1 ≻ a3 ≻ a2),
T3 = (1, 1, 1, −1, −1, −1) ∼ (a1 ≻ a4 ≻ a3 ≻ a2),
T4 = (1, 1, 1, 1, −1, −1) ∼ (a1 ≻ a4 ≻ a2 ≻ a3),
T5 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, −1) ∼ (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a4 ≻ a3),
T6 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) ∼ (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a4).
It is important to note that the linear combination representation
of an arbitrary societal preference outcome is not necessarily unique,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 2.3.3. Let V = {1, 2, 3} be the set of voters and A =
{a1, a2, a3} be the set of alternatives. Consider the societal prefer-
ence ordering
g(p) = (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3).
Then each of the following specifications of the profile p give rise to
g(p) as above.
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(1) p =


1 2 3
a1 a1 a1
a2 a2 a2
a3 a3 a3


(2) p =


1 2 3
a3 a1 a2
a1 a2 a1
a2 a3 a3


(3) p =


1 2 3
a1 a1, a2 a1
a2, a3 a3 a2
a3


In addition to the profiles in the previous example, we also note
that the linear combination
v =
(n2)∑
i=1
βiT
′
i , βi ∈ N,
is not unique in that once we have fixed a labeling of the voters,
there are
(n2)−1∏
i=1
(
β −
∑i−1
j=1 βj
βi
)
ways to assign the preference orderings to the β individuals.
2.4 Minimum Voter Attainability Thresholds
We have shown that an arbitrary complete antisymmetric relation
on n alternatives is a simple majority rule societal preference out-
come of some society. By example, we have seen that a given societal
preference outcome may be the result of majority rule applied to dis-
tinct profiles on a fixed number of voters. The following example
illustrates that the number of voters necessary to produce a given
societal preference outcome is also not unique.
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Example 2.4.1. Let A = {a1, a2, a3} be the set of alternatives and
consider the societal preference ordering
g(p) = (a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3).
Then each of the following specifications of the profile p give rise to
g(p) as above.
(1) p =


1
a1
a2
a3


(2) p =


1 2 3
a1 a1 a1
a2 a2 a2
a3 a3 a3


(3) p =


1 2 3 4 5
a3 a1 a2 a1 a3
a1 a2 a1 a2 a2
a2 a3 a3 a3 a1


The above example illustrates a trivial manner in which the num-
ber of voters can be increased without changing the societal prefer-
ence outcome: pairs of voters can be added whose preference order-
ings are opposite. There are indeed more complex ways in which the
number of voters can vary, and we wish to determine the minimum
number of voters necessary to produce a given societal preference
outcome. Let µ(n) denote the minimum number of voters with pref-
erence orderings in LS(A) needed to obtain all societal preference
outcomes on n alternatives.
Although the linear algebraic proof of attainability is more el-
egant than direct construction, it offers no insight concerning the
function µ. However, using the vector representation we have devel-
oped we can provide a lower bound on µ(n).
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Lemma 2.4.2. If A = {a1, . . . , an} is the set of alternatives, then
µ(n) ≥
⌈(
n
2
)
ln(3)
ln(n!)
⌉
.
Proof. Let V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters and A = {a1, . . . , an}
be the set of alternatives. Since voter preference orderings are strict
linear orderings, there are n! preference orderings voters may hold.
Suppose that every assignment of preference orderings to the voters
produces a unique societal preference ordering, so that m voters can
produce n!m distinct societal preference outcomes. Note that this is
a severe overestimate, as the anonymity property of simple majority
rules ensures that relabeling of the voters will have no impact on the
societal preference outcome.
For each pair of alternatives (ai, aj), there are three possible re-
lations that can exist in the societal preference ordering: ai ≻ aj ,
ai ∼ aj, or ai ≺ aj . Therefore there are 3
(n2) possible preference
patterns on n alternatives.
Therefore, the minimum number of voters m must be such that
3(
n
2) ≤ (n!)m.
Solving for m gives
µ(n) ≥
⌈(
n
2
)
ln(3)
ln(n!)
⌉
,
where we take the ceiling since m ∈ Z.
µ(n) > max
{
m | (n!)m ≥ 3(
n
2)
}
= max
{
m | m ln(n!) ≥
(
n
2
)
ln(3)
}
= max
{
m | m ≥
(
n
2
) ln(3)
ln(n!)
}
=
⌈(
n
2
) ln(3)
ln(n!)
⌉
.
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It is important to note that the function µ(n) gives the minimum
number of voters necessary to produce an arbitrary simple major-
ity rule societal preference outcome. This number may be greater
than the minimum number of voters needed to produce a specific
outcome. Letting S represent the set of social preference outcomes
on n alternatives,
µ(n) = max
s∈S
min {m : m voters are sufficient to produce s} .
The minimum number of voters needed to produce a specific simple
majority rule societal outcome on n alternatives may differ substan-
tially from µ(n); the most extreme example is that of a transitive
societal preference outcome, in which one voter is sufficient.
Example 2.4.3. Let A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of alternatives and
gM(p) be a transitive simple majority rule societal outcome. Then
we can construct such a profile p with only one voter, by setting
p(1) = g(p).
The work of McGarvey and others provides improved bounds.
Using McGarvey’s constructive approach to proving attainability
requires m = 2
(
n
2
)
voters, where n is the number of alternatives.
This arises from construction, since for each unique pair (ai, aj) two
voter preference orderings are assigned. Not surprisingly McGar-
vey’s method can be modified so as to decrease the number of voters
required by incorporating the preference relations on multiple alter-
native pairs (ai, aj) into each voter’s preference ordering. A detailed
discussion of the modified algorithm is given in McGarvey[13]. With
these modifications, at least m = n(n+1) voters are needed, where
n is the number of alternatives.
Stearns [18] shows that the information included in each voter
preference ordering can be further compacted, so that µ(n) ≤ n+1
when n is odd. Using an approximation for n!, Stearns further shows
that µ(n) > 0.55n
lnn
when n is large. Figure 2.3 displays Stearns upper
and lower bounds on the minimum number m of voters needed to
obtain an arbitrary societal preference outcome on n alternatives,
as well as the bounds computed here. Table 2.1 summarizes the
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Figure 2.3: Upper and Lower Minimum Voter Attainability Bounds
McGarvey: Naive Construction m = 2
(
n
2
)
Compact Construction m = n(n+ 1)
Stearns: n Odd µ(n) ≤ n+ 1
n Large µ(n) >
0.55n
lnn
Merrill: Any n µ(n) ≥
⌈(
n
2
) ln(3)
ln(n!)
⌉
Table 2.1: Minimum Voter Attainability Results
As a final note, Stearns’ lower bound and the lower bound derived
here demonstrate that no finite number of voters is ever sufficient
to produce all societal preference outcomes if the number of alter-
natives is made sufficiently large.
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2.5 The Distribution of Societal Outcomes
We have seen that societal preference outcomes from simple major-
ity rule may contain cycles, and that the existence of such cycles
complicates practical decision-making processes. We have also seen
that majority rules possess a number of desirable properties. Thus
as a mater of practical implementation the frequency of intransi-
tive simple majority rule societal preference outcomes is of vital
importance: if the probability of obtaining an intransitive societal
preference outcome is small, we may wish to implement simple ma-
jority rule to enjoy its desirable properties (most of the time). In
situations where majority rule fails to produce a transitive outcome,
another rule could be used that guarantees transitivity.
We therefore wish to determine the probability distribution of all
simple majority rule societal preference outcomes with respect to
the profile space, as a function of the number of voters and number
of alternatives. This is equivalent to determining the probability
distribution of the intransitive societal preference outcomes alone,
as symmetry ensures that all transitive outcomes will be equally
likely.
Our vector representations provide a constructive method for
counting the total number of societal outcomes. For any set of
voters V = {1, . . . , m} and alternatives A = {a1, . . . , an} where m
is even, there are exactly 3(
n
2) societal preference outcomes, since
there are three possible values (−1, 0, 1) for each of the
(
n
2
)
compo-
nents of a societal preference outcome vector representations, and
each unique assignment of the components produces a unique social
preference outcome. As previously discussed, when m is odd there
are only 2(
n
2) societal preference outcomes. Moreover exactly n! of
the societal preference outcomes are transitive regardless of the par-
ity of m, because there are exactly n! unique permutations of the
natural transitive ordering
a1 ≻ a2 ≻ · · · ≻ an−1 ≻ an.
A naive approach might suppose that each societal outcome is
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n P (T |n), m Even P (T |n), m Odd
3 0.222 0.750
4 0.033 0.375
5 0.002 0.117
6 5.018 ×10−5 0.022
7 4.818 ×10−7 0.002
8 1.762 ×10−9 1.502 ×10−4
9 2.418 ×10−12 5.281 ×10−6
10 1.228 ×10−15 1.031 ×10−7
Table 2.2: Naive Estimation of Transitivity
equally likely (although it is quickly apparent that this assumption is
grossly inaccurate). In that case, we might estimate the probability
of transitivity by
P (T |n) =
n!
3(
n
2)
or P (T |n) =
n!
2(
n
2)
,
when m is even and when m is odd, respectively. Table 2.2 contains
exact values for n = 3, . . . , 10 and Figure 2.4 plots the probability
functions. Note that the function has no interpretation at non-
integer values; evaluations at integer values have been connected so
that the two functions can be easily distinguished.
The naive approach to calculating offers significant insight into
the question of transitivity. The probability of obtaining a transi-
tive simple majority rule societal preference outcome goes to zero
very quickly, which implies that if the true probability of transi-
tivity likely also goes to zero unless transitive outcomes must be
substantially more probable than intransitive outcomes.
Attempts to compute the distribution of simple majority rule so-
cietal preference outcomes analytically proved extraordinarily com-
plex; indeed, we have no analytic solution to present. In the absence
of an analytic solution, an empirical analysis was undertaken. The
next section presents and discusses our empirical results.
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Figure 2.4: Naive Estimation of Transitivity
2.6 Empirical Probability of Transitivity
The distribution of societal preference outcomes arising from simple
majority rule appears to be an intractable combinatoric problem.
Nevertheless, the formulation of the problem is sufficiently simple
that it may be calculated explicitly via exhaustive computation. For
the sake of computational simplicity, the following assumptions were
imposed:
• There is a fixed labeling of voters and alternatives.
• All voter preference orderings are strict linear orders on the set
of alternatives.
• There is an odd number of voters, so that the societal preference
outcome is a complete, asymmetric relation.
Given these assumptions, the algorithm is formulated as follows.
Algorithm 2.6.1. For each profile p in the profile space,
1. Compute the simple majority rule societal preference outcome,
g(p).
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m n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7
3 0.9444 0.8299 0.6757 0.5099 0.3573
5 0.9306 0.7898 – – –
Table 2.3: Computed Probabilities of Transitivity
2. Increment the frequency for the observed outcome.
The algorithm was implemented serially for three and five vot-
ers in MATLAB and FORTRAN, and in parallel in FORTRAN.
With three voters, the program was run with three through seven
alternatives; with five voters, only three and four alternatives were
considered due to excessive runtimes.
In addition to calculating the frequency of each simple major-
ity rule societal preference outcome, the transitivity score of each
outcome was computed. Appendices A-G contain the computed fre-
quencies and transitivity scores for the computed cases. Appendices
H-I contain the serial and parallel FORTRAN code, respectively.
The computations provided several interesting results, both ex-
pected and unexpected. First, we found that for the cases consid-
ered, the probability of transitivity decreased in both the number
of voters and the number of alternatives. This result was generally
expected, as increased voters allow for more complex cycle struc-
ture in the outcome, and increased alternatives provide increased
opportunities for cycles to form. The rate at which the probability
went to zero was somewhat unexpected; it suggests that the true
probability may in fact go to zero.
Other surprising features arose from the data. With three voters
and three, four, or five alternatives, we found that the frequencies
were monotonic in transitivity scores, although the frequencies pro-
vided a finer partition of the societal preference outcomes. These
observations seemed to support the practical implementation of ma-
jority rule, as the most frequent outcomes were also the most tran-
sitive. However when three voters and six alternatives were consid-
ered, this monotonicity broke down.
Our analysis has been unable to discover the reason for this
change, although we suspect it might be related to an open question
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n F (T ) F (ITmin) F (ITavg)
3 34 6 6.00
4 478 30 58.80
5 9730 30 619.91
6 264334 54 5707.92
7 9076864 42 38819.86
Table 2.4: Outcome Frequencies for Three Voters
in graph theory: the number of distinct unlabeled complete asym-
metric digraphs with six or more nodes. An unlabeled digraph with
five or fewer nodes can be completely characterized by the in-degree
and out-degree of each node; this is not the case for graphs with six
or more nodes. Unfortunately, transitivity scores could not be com-
puted for the case of three voters and seven alternatives, again due
to excessive runtimes. We therefore do not have subsequent data
to confirm this break down in monotonicity for greater numbers of
alternatives.
Another characteristic of the data is that the transitive outcomes
were the most frequent in all cases considered; indeed, they were
three to four times as frequent as the most frequent intransitive
outcome. This pattern offers hope that even if the overall probability
of transitivity goes to zero, the most probable outcomes may indeed
be transitive outcomes.
These empirical exercises have generated a huge amount of data;
indeed, more than could be sufficiently analyzed in the course of
this project. We hope that the data might prove useful to future
researchers in the area, and may be used at some point to validate
or test hypotheses concerning the analytic distribution. Based on
our analysis of these data, we put forth two conjectures.
Conjecture 2.6.2. Under simple majority rule, an arbitrary tran-
sitive societal preference outcome is more probable than the average
intransitive societal preference outcome.
Conjecture 2.6.2 is strongly supported by the data. Figure 2.5 is
a plot of the ratioratio
F (T )
F (ITavg)
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for three voters and three through seven alternatives, where F (T ) is
the frequency of an arbitrary transitive societal preference outcome,
F (ITmin) is the frequency of the least frequent societal preference
outcome, and F (ITavg) is the average frequency of all the intransitive
societal preference outcomes.
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Figure 2.5: Ratio of Frequency of Transitive to Average Frequency of Intransi-
tive Outcome
Conjecture 2.6.3. Under simple majority rule, an arbitrary tran-
sitive societal preference outcome is more probable than an arbitrary
intransitive societal preference outcome.
Future research may provide the tools necessary to prove or dis-
prove these conjectures. The available empirical evidence supports
both, but an analytic proof has remained elusive.
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Chapter 3
Borda Rules
3.1 Generalized Borda Rules
Qualitatively, generalized Borda rules produce a societal preference
outcome via the following procedure:
1. Each voter is given n tokens, where each token has a pre-defined
value.
2. Each voter places the highest value token in the urn of their
most-preferred alternative, the second-highest value token in
the urn for their second-most-preferred alternative, etc.
3. After all the voters have distributed their tokens, the total value
of the tokens in each urn is computed.
4. The alternatives are ranked in descending order according to
the total value in their urns.
With this qualitative understanding in mind, we proceed with a
formal definition.
Let V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters, and A = {a1, . . . , an} be
the set of alternatives. Define the ranking function r : A× LA −→
{1, . . . , n} by
r(ai, p(j)) = k ⇔ pk(j) = ai.
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When evaluated at (ai, p(j)), the ranking function therefore gives the
rank of alternative ai in the voter preference ordering p(j), where p
is some profile and j ∈ V . Next define a real-valued scoring function
s(k) for k = 1, . . . , n such that
k1 < k2 ⇒ s(k1) > s(k2).
In our earlier qualitative description, the scoring function assigns
the value to each of the n tokens.
Define a vector Σ(p) ∈ Rn by
Σ(p)i =
m∑
j=1
s(r(ai, p(j))).
Again in reference to our qualitative description, Σ(p)i corresponds
to the total value of the tokens in the urn associated with alternative
ai. We may therefore compute the societal preference ordering of a
generalized Borda Rule at a profile p by
• ai ≻gBs (p) aj if and only if Σ(p)i > Σ(p)j .
• ai ∼gBs (p) aj if and only if Σ(p)i = Σ(p)j .
Lemma 3.1.1. Generalized Borda rules are unanimous, anony-
mous, neutral, and consistent.
Proof. Let V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters, A = {a1, . . . , an} be
the set of alternatives, and s be a scoring function for a generalized
Borda rule g.
Let p be a profile at which there exists ai ∈ A such that ai ∈
p1(j) for all j ∈ V . Then r(ai, p(j)) = 1 for all j ∈ V so that
s(r(ai, p(j))) ≥ s(r(ak, p(j))) for all ak ∈ A \ {ai} and all j ∈ V , by
monotonicity of s. Therefore,
Σ(p)i =
m∑
j=1
s(r(ai, p(j))) ≥
m∑
j=1
s(r(ak, p(j))) = Σ(p)k,
for all ak ∈ A \ {ai}. By the definition of g, we therefore have
ai ∈ g1(p) so g is unanimous.
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Let σV be a permutation of the voters. Then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Σ(σ(p))i =
m∑
j=1
s(r(ai, p(σV (j)))) =
m∑
j=1
s(r(ai, p(j))) = Σ(p)i,
since addition is commutative. Therefore, g is anonymous.
Next let σA be a permutation of the alternatives, with σˆA the
corresponding permutation on the indices {1, . . . , n}. Then
Σ(σA(p))i =
m∑
j=1
s(r(σ(ai), p(j))) =
m∑
j=1
s(r(aσˆA(i), p(j))) = Σ(p)σˆA(i),
so g is neutral.
Let V1 (|V1| = m1) and V2 (|V2| = m2) be two disjoint sets of
voters. Let profile p1 contain preference orderings for voters in V1,
and profile p2 contain preference orderings for voters in V2. Let p be
the profile on V = V1 ∪ C2 such that p coincides with p1 on V1 and
with p2 on V2. Then
Σ(p)i =
∑
j∈V
s(r(ai, p(j))) =
∑
j∈V1
s(r(ai, p(j)))+
∑
j∈V2
s(r(ai, p(j))) = Σ(p1)i+Σ(p2)i.
If
Σ(p1)i = Σ(p2)i > Σ(p2)j = Σ(p1)j
for some i, j, then
Σ(p)i = Σ(p1)i + Σ(p2)i > Σ(p1)j + Σ(p2)j = Σ(p)j ,
so g is consistent.
As with the generalized majority rule, generalized Borda rules
must fail to satisfy one of the conditions of Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem. We next state this failure here as a proposition; we will
prove it by means of example in the case of the standard Borda rule
in the next section.
Proposition 3.1.2. Generalized Borda rules do not satisfy inde-
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pendence of irrelevant alternatives.
3.2 Standard Borda Rule
Define gB to be the standard Borda rule (Borda’s rule), for which
s(k) = n− k+1. As a generalized Borda rule, Borda’s rule displays
all of the properties of a generalized Borda rule. In the previous
section we stated, but did not prove, that generalized Borda rules do
not satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives. Next we consider
an example of this failure.
Example 3.2.1. Let V = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of voters, A =
{a1, a2, a3} be a set of alternatives, and A
+ = {a1, a2, a3, a4} be an-
other set of alternatives. Consider the following profile p on A,
p =


1 2 3 4
a1 a2 a3 a2
a3 a1 a2 a3
a2 a3 a1 a1

 .
At this profile Σ(p) = (7, 9, 8) so that gB(p) = (a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a1). Next
consider the profile p+ on A+
p+ =


1 2 3 4
a1 a2 a3 a2
a3 a1 a4 a3
a4 a3 a2 a1
a2 a4 a1 a4

 ,
which is formed from profile p by inserting alternative a4 into each
voter’s preference ordering. At this profile, we have Σ(p+) = (10, 11, 12, 7)
so that
gB(p
+) = (a3 ≻ a2 ≻ a1 ≻ a4).
Therefore, we have a2 ≻gB(p) a3 and a3 ≻ gB(p
+)a2, so Borda’s
rule does not satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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Borda’s rule is also susceptible to manipulation, as the following
example illustrates.
Example 3.2.2. Let V = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Con-
sider the profile
p =


1 2 3
a2 a1 a3
a1 a3 a4
a3 a4 a2
a4 a2 a1

 ,
at which Σ(p) = (8, 7, 9, 6) so that gB(p) = (a3 ≻ a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a4).
Next, consider the profile
q =


1 2 3
a1 a1 a3
a2 a3 a4
a4 a4 a2
a3 a2 a1

 ,
at which q(i) = p(i) for i = 2, 3 and Σ(q) = (9, 6, 8, 7) so that
gB(q) = (a1 ≻ a3 ≻ a4 ≻ a2).
Note that alternative a3 is first-ranked in gB(q) and alternative a1
is first-ranked in gB(p), and that a1 ≻p(i) a3. Therefore, individual 1
will manipulate at profile p via the preference ordering q(1) to ensure
the promotion of alternative a1 to the top of the societal preference
outcome.
Whereas failure to satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives
is suggested by Arrow’s theorem, the manipulability of Borda’s rule
is suggested by the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. Although both
are considered undesirable properties of a social welfare rule, suscep-
tibility to strategic manipulation is often considered a more grievous
failure. We will therefore establish the framework for the quantifi-
cation of manipulability of Borda’s rule.
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3.2.1 Measure of Manipulation
We wish to quantify the extent to which Borda’s rule is susceptible
to manipulation as a function of the number of voters and the num-
ber of alternatives. We will therefore establish a measure of local
manipulability; that is, to what extent can a voter manipulate at
a specific profile. To form an overall measure of manipulability we
will average the local measures over the profile space, assuming that
each profile is equally likely.
Given a profile p on m voters, our local measure of manipulabil-
ity computes the proportion of alternatives not top-ranked in the
societal preference outcome that can be promoted to top-ranked by
a voter entering the society. A formal definition of this measure
follows.
Let V1 = {1, . . . , m − 1} be set of voters, V2 = {m} be a single-
ton set consisting of one voter, and A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of
alternatives. If p is some profile containing the preference orderings
of the voters in V1 and q(m) is a preference ordering of individual
m, define pq to a profile such that pq(i) = p(i) for i = 1, . . . , m− 1
and pq(m) = q(m).
Next define the set Λ(p) by
Λ(p) = {ai : ∃q(m) s.t. ai ∈ g1(pq) and ai 6∈ g1(p)}.
That is, Λ(p) is the set of alternatives that were not top-ranked
in the societal preference outcome at g(p), but could be made top-
ranked in the societal preference outcome by voter m contributing
their preference ordering. Intuitively, this set corresponds to our
notion of manipulability since voter m can freely promote any of
the alternatives in Λ(p) to the top of the social preference outcome.
Next define the function λ(p) by
λ(p) =
|Λ(p)|
|A \ g1(p)|
.
As previously alluded to, λ(p) is the proportion of non-top-ranked
alternatives that can be promoted to the top of the societal pref-
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erence ordering by voter m. By construction, 0 ≤ λ(p) < 1 for all
profiles p.
There are many potential measure of manipulability, although
there are none in the literature with which we are familiar. The
appeal of the above measure is its congruence with our formal and
intuitive concept of manipulation and the ease with which it can be
computed. In the next section we take advantage of the computa-
tional ease of this measure.
3.3 Computation of Manipulability
As was the case with simple majority rule, analysis of the entire
profile space was limited to a small number cases due to excessive
runtimes; for n voters and m alternatives there are n!m profiles in
the profile space LS(A). Analysis of the entire profile space was nev-
ertheless conducted for two through four voters and three through
seven alternatives. Analysis of the entire profile space utilized the
following algorithm.
Algorithm 3.3.1 (Exact Manipulation Score). Let V = {1, . . . , m}
be the set of voters and A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of alternatives.
For every profile p ∈ LS(A)
(m−1) on m− 1 voters,
1. Store the set g1(p).
2. Set Λ(p) := ∅.
3. For of the n! each preference orderings q(m) on A,
(a) Construct pq by appending the preference ordering q(m) to
the profile p.
(b) Determine the set g1(pq).
(c) For i = 1, . . . , n, if ai ∈ g1(pq) and ai 6∈ g1(p), set Λ(p) :=
Λ(p) ∪ {ai}.
4. Compute λ(p) =
|Λ(p)|
|A \ g1(p)|
.
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n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7
m = 2 0.517 0.539 0.574 0.595 0.603
m = 3 0.454 0.482 0.488 0.494 0.500
m = 4 0.401 0.415 0.426 0.436 0.434
Table 3.1: Exact Manipulation Score for Borda’s Rule
To compute the average manipulation score, let
λ¯ =
1
n!(m−1)
∑
p∈LS(A)(m−1)
λ(p).
The MATLAB implementation of this algorithm is available in
Appendix M, and the results of the algorithm for two through four
voters and three through seven alternatives are available in Table
3.1. Two distinct trends emerge from the analysis of the entire
profile space. First, we note that as the number of alternatives
increase, Borda’s rule is increasingly susceptible to manipulation by
our measure. Moreover, since the manipulability score measures the
proportion of non-top-ranking alternatives that can be promoted to
the top of the social preference outcome, the score is not merely
being inflated due to the large total number of alternatives.
Second, we note that as the number of voters increases, Borda’s
rule becomes less susceptible to manipulation by our measure. In
a real voting setting we might attribute this decline to increased
uncertainty on the part of the mth voter concerning the preference
of the previous m−1 voters. However, this metric of manipulability
assumes that the mth voter has complete knowledge of the conse-
quence of reporting every of the n! preference orderings at his or her
disposal. Rather, the decrease in manipulability appears to reflect
the decrease in the ratio of the number of points the mth voter can
contribute to an alternative relative to the number of points the
previous m− 1 voters have already distributed.
When the size of the profile space grew too large to allow for
exact computation of the average manipulation score, average scores
were approximated by randomly sampling in the profile space. This
was conducted for five through ten voters, and three through seven
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alternatives. Sampling utilized the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3.3.2 (Approximation of Manipulation Score). Let V =
{1, . . . , m} be the set of voters, A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of alter-
natives, and s be the sample size. For i = 1, . . . , s,
1. Randomly generate a profile p ∈ LS(A)
(m−1) on m− 1 voters.
2. Store the set g1(p).
3. Set Λ(i) := ∅.
4. For of the n! each preference orderings q(m) on A,
(a) Construct pq by appending the preference ordering q(m) to
the profile p.
(b) Determine the set g1(pq).
(c) For j = 1, . . . , n, if aj ∈ g1(pq) and aj 6∈ g1(p), set Λ(i) :=
Λ(i) ∪ {aj}.
5. Compute λ(i) =
|Λ(i)|
|A \ g1(p)|
.
To compute the approximate average manipulation score, let
ˆ¯λ =
1
S
S∑
i=1
λ(i).
The MATLAB implementation of this algorithm is available in
Appendix L. As sampling techniques are inherently less reliable than
exhaustive techniques, we proceed with brief discussion of the sam-
pling process.
Sampling was conducted without replacement. In the smallest
case, the profile space consistent of over 7,000 profiles, so the prob-
ability of randomly sampling the sample profile more than once was
small. Furthermore, the storage capacity needed to ensure that pro-
files were re-sampled would have significantly reduced this number
of cases we were able to consider.
Profiles were randomly sampling by indexing the n! preference
orderings voters were permitted to report and randomly assigning
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n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7
m = 5 0.363 0.375 0.381 0.383 0.386
m = 6 0.342 0.346 0.346 0.349 0.349
m = 7 0.317 0.329 0.328 0.332 0.333
m = 8 0.294 0.305 0.308 0.309 0.309
m = 9 0.278 0.286 0.285 0.287 0.289
m = 10 0.263 0.271 0.273 0.272 0.276
Table 3.2: Simulated Manipulation Score for Borda’s Rule
a preference ordering to each voter using the MATLAB random
number generator with the seed set by the system clock. For each
specification of m voters and n alternatives, a sample size of 15% of
the profile space was selected (s = 0.15×n!(m−1)). The threshold of
15% was selected through trial and error as the minimum proportion
of the profile space that consistently produced approximations of the
average manipulation score that were reliable to two decimal places.
Using this sampling procedure, ten replications of the program
were run for each (m,n) pair. The approximate averages from each
of the ten replications were then averaged. The results are available
in Table 3.2.
Although there the patterns are slightly less consistent in the
approximated manipulation scores relative to the exact scores, the
same patterns are apparent. Approximated manipulation scores for
Borda’s rule increase as the number of alternatives are increased,
but decrease as the number of voters is decreased.
The consistent and intuitive pattern that arose from computa-
tion of manipulation scores for the standard Borda rule motivated
an analysis of manipulability for other generalized Borda rules. In
particular, one framework was chosen on which to focus additional
analysis.
Let s1 denote the scoring function of the standard Borda rule, and
let s2 denote an exponential scoring function, where s2(k) = e
n−k+1,
where n is the number of alternatives.
Example 3.3.3. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, A = {a1, a2, a3}
denote the set of alternatives, and s2 be the exponential scoring func-
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tion. Then at the profile
p =


1 2
a2 a1
a1 a3
a3 a2

 ,
we have
Σ(p) =

 e2 + e3e3 + e1
e1 + e2

 ≈

 27.4722.80
10.11

 .
Using the standard and exponential scoring functions, we imple-
mented a program that sampled randomly from the profile space, at
each profile calculated the manipulation score of a number of Borda
rules with weights that were linear combinations of s1 and s2. The
program utilized the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3.3.4. Let V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters, A =
{a1, . . . , an} be the set of alternatives, S be the sample size, and
δ ∈ (0, 1) be a step-size parameter that divides 1. For i = 1, . . . , S,
1. Randomly generate a profile p ∈ LS(A)
(m−1) on m− 1 voters.
2. Store the set g1(p).
3. For of the n! each preference orderings q(m) on A:
(a) Construct pq by appending the preference ordering q(m) to
the profile p.
(b) For d = 0, δ, 2δ, . . . , 1,
i. Set Λ(i, d) = ∅.
ii. Determine the set g1(pq), where g has scoring function
s = ds1 + (1− d)s2.
iii. For j = 1, . . . , n, if aj ∈ g1(pq) and aj 6∈ g1(p), set
Λ(i, d) := Λ(i, d) ∪ {aj}.
iv. Compute λ(i, d) =
|Λ(p)|
|A \ g1(p)|
.
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To compute the approximate average manipulation score for the
Borda rule with scoring function s = ds1 + (1− d)s2, let
ˆ¯λd =
1
S
S∑
i=1
λ(i, d).
The sampling technique employed in this algorithm was identical
to that of Algorithm 3.3.2. To isolate differences in manipulation
scores from sampling variation, manipulation scores were computed
at the same profiles for all Borda rules indexed by d.
Unlike the previous results, the approximated manipulation scores
for the Borda rules with convex standard–exponential scoring func-
tions displayed an unexpected result. Prior to running the simula-
tion, we hypothesized that manipulation scores would be monotonic
in d; that is, one of standard weights or exponential weights would
have a higher average manipulation score. Instead we found an un-
expected oscillatory behavior in the manipulation scores, depicted
in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.1: Convex Borda Manipulability Scores, 2 Voters
These results suggest the need for additional study of the impact
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Figure 3.2: Convex Borda Manipulability Scores, 3 Voters
of Borda weights on manipulability. To date we have not found a
satisfactory theoretical explanation for this behavior.
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Chapter 4
A Matricial Approach to
Social Choice Theory
Let V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters and A = {a1, . . . , an} be
the set of alternatives. Given a voter k’s preference ordering p(k) on
A, we can encode p(k) into the n× n matrix P (k) by the following
procedure:
Algorithm 4.0.5. Let p(k) be a preference relation on A. Then
define the matrix representation P (k) by
1. If ai ≻p(k) aj, let P (k)ij = 1,
2. If ai ∼p(k) aj, let P (k)ij = 0,
Given a profile p, we define the matrix representation of p by
P =
m∑
k=1
P (k).
By construction, the elements of the matrix P satisfy the following
properties:
• Pij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• Pii = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
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• Pij + Pji = m for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i 6= j.
We next consider an explicit example in terms of the matrix
representation.
Example 4.0.6 (The Matricial French Triple). Let V = {1, 2, 3}
and A = {a1, a2, a3} and consider the profile
p =


1 2 3
a1 a3 a2
a2 a1 a3
a3 a2 a1

 .
Using the matrix representations, we have
P (1) =

 0 1 10 0 1
0 0 0

 , P (2) =

 0 1 00 0 0
1 1 0

 , P (3) =

 0 0 01 0 1
1 0 0

 ,
and therefore
P =

 0 2 11 0 1
2 1 0

 .
Many social choice rules can be formulated matricially, and in
many cases the analysis of rules is simplified by this formulation.
We will next revisit generalized majority and Borda rules from a
matricial perspective, as well as introduce a new rule which can
only be formulation in terms of voting matrices.
4.1 Simple Majority Rule
By Algorithm 1.3.1, we can represent each voter’s preferences as a
profile p by a ±1/0-vector, v(k). We can therefore define simple
majority rule by
gM(v) = ν
(
m∑
i=1
v(i)
)
,
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where
ν(α) =


1 if 0 < α
0 if 0 = α
−1 if 0 > α.
is a normalizing function.
We consider a concrete example using the matricial formulation
of simple majority rule.
Example 4.1.1. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters and A =
{a1, a2, a3, a4} be the set of alternatives. Let v be a profile such
that
v(1) =


1
1
1
−1
−1
1


, v(2) =


−1
1
−1
1
−1
−1


That is,
vT =
(
0 2 0 0 −2 0
)
,
so that
gM(v)
T =
(
0 1 0 0 −1 0
)
.
This vector profile corresponds to a profile p where
p =


1 2
a1 a4
a3 a2
a4 a1
a2 a3


has the societal preference outcome depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Societal Preference Outcome at Profile p
4.2 Standard Borda Rule
By Algorithm 1.3.1, we can represent each voter’s preferences as a
profile p by a ±1/0-vector, v(k). We can therefore define Borda’s
rule by
gB(v) = r
(
M ×
m∑
i=1
v(i)
)
,
where r(s) is a ranking function that ranks the alternatives ai ac-
cording to the value of si and M is an n×
(
n
2
)
matrix defined by the
following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.1. Let M be an n×
(
n
2
)
matrix.
Set Mij := 0 for all i, j.
Set c := 1.
For j := 1, . . . , n− 1,
For i := j + 1, . . . , n,
Set Mi,c := 1.
Set Mj,c := −1.
Set c := c+ 1.
Again, we consider a concrete example.
Example 4.2.2. Let V = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a1, a2, a3}. Consider
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a profile p such that
p =


1 2 3
a1 a2 a1
a2 a1 a3
a3 a3 a2

 ,
so that p has vector representation
v(1) =

 11
1

 , v(2) =

 −11
1

 , v(2) =

 11
−1

 ,
vT =
(
1 3 1
)
.
Using our algorithm we have
M =

 1 1 0−1 0 1
0 −1 −1

 ,
so that the Borda’s rule societal preference outcome is
gB(v) =M × v =

 1 1 0−1 0 1
0 −1 −1

×

 13
1

 =

 4−2
−2

 .
Ranking the alternatives ai by their score gB(v)i gives the societal
preference outcome
(a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3).
4.3 The Perron Rule
Let V = {1, . . . , m} be the set of voters and A = {a1, . . . , an} be
the set of alternatives. Define the matrix A = P +J , where P is the
matrix representation of a profile and where J is the n × n matrix
such that Jij = 1 for all i, j. Therefore, we have that P is a square
matrix with Pij > 0 for all i, j and we may apply Perron’s Theorem.
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Theorem 4.3.1 (Perron’s Theorem). If A ∈ Mn and A > 0, then
• ρ(A) > 0;
• ρ(A) is an eigenvalue of A;
• There is an x ∈ Cn with x > 0 and Ax = ρ(A)x;
• ρ(A) is an algebraically simple eigenvalue of A;
• ρ(A) is the unique eigenvalue of maximum modulus,
where ρ(A) is the spectral radius of A.
Given a matrix A, we may therefore compute the Perron eigen-
vector, that is the vector vA satisfying the equation
AvA = ρ(A)vA.
We therefore define Perron’s rule as
gP (P ) = r (vP+J) ,
where r(s) is a ranking function that ranks the alternatives ai ac-
cording to the value of si.
Borda’s Rule gives a first approximation of Perron’s Rule.
4.3.1 Analysis of Perron Manipulability
We wish to analyze the manipulability of Perron’s rule as we ana-
lyzed the manipulability of Borda’s rule. Analytic analysis of manip-
ulability is hindered by the complex calculations needed to compute
the Perron societal preference outcome. It is not at all clear how
minor variations in the P (k) matrices induce changes in the societal
preference outcome gP (P ). The relationship in manipulability of
the two rules is of particular interest because Borda’s rule provides
a first approximation of Perron’s rule [8].
To investigate the question of manipulability, computer simula-
tion was employed. The sampling algorithm was as follows:
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n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7
m = 2 0.725 0.893 0.978 0.993 0.999
m = 3 0.730 0.873 0.977 0.997 0.999
m = 4 0.758 0.798 0.933 0.987 0.998
m = 5 0.569 0.795 0.925 0.978 0.997
m = 6 0.650 0.745 0.889 0.960 0.993
m = 7 0.533 0.720 0.871 0.947 0.989
m = 8 0.580 0.686 0.838 0.927 0.981
m = 9 0.510 0.660 0.823 0.914 0.974
m = 10 0.541 0.640 0.788 0.893 0.965
Table 4.1: Simulated Perron’s Rule Manipulability Score
Algorithm 4.3.2 (Manipulability Comparison). For a fixed number
of voters (m) and alternatives (n),
1. Obtain a profile, p, by sampling randomly from the profile space,
2. Compute the profile matrix P from p,
3. Compute the societal preference orderings gP (P ) and gB(p),
4. Evaluate the manipulability of each of gP (P ) and gB(p) using
the previous algorithm.
The MATLAB code for this algorithm is available in Appendix
L. To isolate differences in manipulability from sampling variation,
manipulability of the Perron and Borda rules are calculated with re-
spect to the same preference profile in each iteration. The sampling
was conducted using the same techniques as previously discussed.
Table 4.1 contains estimates for the Perron rule manipulability
score for a large number of cases. In comparison to the Tables 3.1
and 3.2, Perron’s rule appears to be significantly more manipula-
ble. Although we cannot identify any result in matrix theory that
would suggest this pattern, it the high manipulability scores were
consistent across numerous simulations.
The following figures depict estimated manipulability scores for
the Borda and Perron rules in a number of settings.
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Figure 4.2: Borda vs. Perron Manipulability Scores, 3 Alternatives
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Figure 4.3: Borda vs. Perron Manipulability Scores, 4 Alternatives
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Figure 4.4: Borda vs. Perron Manipulability Scores, 5 Alternatives
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Chapter 5
Appendices
Appendix A: Inventory Analysis for 3 Voters, 3
Alternatives
Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Transitivity Score
6 2 0.3333
24 6 1
P [Transitivity] =
24× 6
3!3
≈ 0.9444.
Appendix B: Inventory Analysis for 3 Voters, 4
Alternatives
Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Transitivity Score
30 24 0.6667
102 16 0.6667
478 24 1
P [Transitivity] =
728× 24
4!3
≈ 0.8299.
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Appendix C: Inventory Analysis for 3 Voters, 5
Alternatives
Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Transitivity Score
30 24 0.4
54 40 0.6
72 120 0.6
144 120 0.6
234 120 0.6
270 120 0.8
798 240 0.8
2286 80 0.8
2418 40 0.8
9730 120 1
P [Transitivity] =
9730× 120
5!3
≈ 0.6757.
64
Appendix D: Inventory Analysis for 3 Voters, 6
Alternatives
Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Transitivity Score
54 240 0.4667
60 1440 0.4667
132 720 0.6
156 1440 0.6
210 1440 0.6
252 480 0.6
282 720 0.7333
288 1440 0.6
324 1440 0.6
360 720 0.6
384 720 0.7333
534 1440 0.6
546 1440 0.6
672 240 0.4667
846 480 0.7333
996 1440 0.7333
1068 720 0.6
1230 288 0.6
1284 1440 0.7333
1734 1440 0.7333
2124 480 0.7333
2790 1440 0.7333
2814 720 0.7333
3000 1440 0.7333
3762 720 0.8667
5688 1440 0.7333
8472 1440 0.7333
10080 1440 0.8667
16272 80 0.7333
25050 1440 0.8667
27174 720 0.8667
65850 480 0.8667
70614 480 0.8667
264334 720 1
P [Transitivity] =
264334× 720
6!3
≈ 0.5099.
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Appendix E: Inventory Analysis for 3 Voters, 7
Alternatives
Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS
42 960 558 15120
48 20160 576 20160
54 25200 612 10080
60 26880 618 10080
66 5040 630 10080
84 1680 636 5040
102 5040 642 5040
108 5040 648 5040
114 5040 654 20160
120 10080 660 15120
126 15120 696 10080
156 15120 702 11760
162 20160 708 10080
168 20160 714 10080
174 5040 720 10080
180 10080 774 10080
192 10080 810 10080
210 5040 834 10080
216 1680 876 10080
228 10080 918 5040
234 30240 936 30240
252 30240 960 15120
258 5040 1140 10080
264 20160 1146 20160
270 1008 1152 6720
282 10080 1158 10080
300 20160 1176 20160
306 10080 1206 10080
318 10080 1236 10080
324 20160 1272 10080
330 10080 1278 10080
360 10080 1296 1680
372 10080 1308 10080
378 5040 1320 10080
420 10080 1332 10080
426 10080 1350 3360
432 10640 1392 15120
450 10080 1440 5040
456 10080 1470 10080
468 10080 1518 10080
504 11760 1524 10080
540 3360 1590 5040
546 10080 1614 10080
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Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS
1704 10080 4338 3360
1746 5040 4464 10080
1782 10080 5322 10080
1788 5040 5724 5040
1800 1680 5952 5040
1950 10080 6054 5040
1956 10080 6210 10080
1992 5040 6390 10080
2052 5040 6564 10080
2094 5040 6594 10080
2112 5040 6630 10080
2130 5040 6690 10080
2136 5040 6792 10080
2142 5040 6894 10080
2184 5040 7518 10080
2190 10080 7872 10080
2214 10080 8004 10080
2232 3360 8400 10080
2274 10080 8490 10080
2340 10080 8646 10080
2400 20160 9408 5040
2412 10080 9474 10080
2472 20160 10206 10080
2580 5040 10260 5040
2598 10080 10554 10080
2688 10080 11292 10080
2772 5040 11400 10080
2844 10080 11424 5040
3006 3360 12780 3360
3132 10080 12936 5040
3162 20160 13536 10080
3222 10080 14040 3360
3378 10080 14148 3360
3384 10080 14826 10080
3516 10080 14838 10080
3522 5040 14964 10080
3672 5040 15444 10080
3762 10080 17538 10080
3804 10080 17754 10080
3948 10080 17802 3360
3954 10080 17916 10080
3996 6720 18354 10080
4002 10080 18666 1680
4152 10080 19008 5040
4260 10080 19338 10080
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Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS
19440 10080 74154 5040
20118 10080 85248 10080
20748 10080 87150 10080
21486 10080 90054 3360
27432 5040 100728 1680
27708 10080 117090 10080
28170 10080 129318 10080
28182 10080 130134 5040
28242 10080 139218 10080
28674 10080 141270 10080
31356 10080 183438 10080
38160 3360 241002 3360
42462 3360 241956 10080
43020 3360 271320 5040
43278 5040 340854 10080
44748 5040 371760 5040
48678 10080 414150 10080
49302 10080 456948 5040
50142 10080 606186 560
51558 5040 652716 1120
53460 2016 942720 10080
55062 10080 1047936 10080
55410 10080 2352612 3360
60510 1008 2526492 3360
68784 10080 2567736 1680
69084 10080 9076864 5040
P [Transitivity] =
9076864× 5040
7!3
≈ 0.3573.
Appendix F: Inventory Analysis for 5 Voters, 3
Alternatives
Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Transitivity Score
270 2 0.3333
1206 6 1
P [Transitivity] =
1206× 6
3!5
≈ 0.9306.
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Appendix G: Inventory Analysis for 5 Voters, 4
Alternatives
Frequency Number of Distinct Labeled CADS Transitivity Score
22410 24 0.6667
71010 16 0.6667
262000 24 1
P [Transitivity] =
262000× 24
4!5
≈ 0.7898.
Appendix H: Serial FORTRAN Inventory Code,
3 Voters
Program Inventory
Implicit none
include "mpif.h"
Integer :: i,j,k
Integer,Allocatable :: POrder(:,:)
Integer,Allocatable :: CAD_Index(:)
Integer :: N
Integer :: iargc,n,nchoosek
Logical :: restart
Integer :: POV
Integer :: Pid, N_proc, ierr
Integer :: TstartA,nlocal,deficit,startl,endA,factorial
Integer :: startA
Character argv*10
Character nstr
Character n3*8
Character cadsID*27, ipos*10
double precision starttime, endtime
interface
Integer Function str2int(nn)
Character nn
Integer :: N
end function str2int
Integer Function Nfact(N)
Integer :: N
Integer i,nfct
end function Nfact
Integer Function NC2(N)
Integer, intent(in) :: N
end function NC2
end interface
call MPI_INIT(ierr)
call MPI_COMM_RANK(MPI_COMM_WORLD,Pid,ierr)
call MPI_COMM_SIZE(MPI_COMM_WORLD,N_proc,ierr)
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n = iargc()
restart = .FALSE.
if (Pid .EQ. 0) then
if ((n < 1) .AND. (n > 2)) then
write(*,*)’ ERROR!! ’
write(*,*)’ The inventory executable requires an input arguement and optional restart’
write(*,*)’ example: inventory 3 restart ’
write(*,*)’ ’
STOP
end if
do i = 0,n
call getarg(i,argv)
if (i .EQ. 1) then
nstr = argv
endif
end do
if (n .EQ. 2) then
restart = .TRUE.
end if
N = str2int(nstr)
end if
call MPI_Bcast(N,1,MPI_INTEGER,0,MPI_COMM_WORLD,ierr)
call MPI_Bcast(nstr,1,MPI_CHARACTER,0,MPI_COMM_WORLD,ierr)
cadsID = ’_CAD_inventory.txt’
ipos = ’_IPOS.txt’
cadsID = nstr//cadsID
ipos = nstr//ipos
nchoosek = NC2(N)
Allocate(CAD_Index(1:2**nchoosek))
Allocate(POrder(1:Nfact(N),1:N))
CAD_Index = 0
202 format(I2,I2,I2)
if (Pid .EQ. 0) then
write(*,*) ’My pid is ’,Pid,’ ipos is ’,ipos
open(12,FILE = ipos)
do i = 1,Nfact(N)
read(12,*) (POrder(i,j), j = 1,N)
end do
close(12)
end if
call MPI_BCAST(POrder,(Nfact(N)*N),MPI_INTEGER,0,MPI_COMM_WORLD,ierr)
starttime = MPI_WTIME()
call three_inventory(N,nchoosek,POrder,CAD_Index,cadsID,restart,N_proc,Pid)
if (Pid .eq. 0) then
open(14,FILE = cadsID)
write(14,*) (CAD_Index(j), j = 1,2**nchoosek)
write(14,*) ’ ’
write(14,*) ’inventory time is ’,endtime-starttime,’ secs’
close(14)
end if
deallocate(POrder)
deallocate(CAD_INDEX)
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201 format (I2,I2,I2)
END Program Inventory
Subroutine three_inventory(N,nchoosek,PO,CAD_Index,fname,restart,N_proc,Pid)
include "mpif.h"
Integer, intent(in) :: N,nchoosek
Integer, intent(in) :: N_proc,Pid
Integer, Dimension(1:Nfact(N),1:N), Intent(in) :: PO
Integer, Dimension(1:2**nchoosek),Intent(inout) :: CAD_Index
Integer, Dimension(1:nchoosek) :: IPO1,IPO2,IPO3
Integer, Dimension(1:nchoosek) :: SPO
Integer, Dimension(1:2**nchoosek) :: Local_CAD_Index
Logical, intent(in) :: restart
Integer :: a,b,c,j,i
Integer :: startA, startB, startC
Integer :: B10_Rep
Integer :: factorial
Character, intent(in) :: fname*27
Integer :: ierr
Integer :: TstartA,nlocal,deficit,startl,endA
Local_CAD_Index = 0
endA = 0
factorial = Nfact(N)
nlocal= factorial/N_proc
startA = (Pid*nlocal) + 1
endA = nlocal*(Pid+1)
counter = 0
if (restart) then
open(9,FILE = "restart.txt", STATUS = "OLD")
read(9,*) startA
read(9,*) (CAD_Index(i), i = 1,2**nchoosek)
close(9)
else
startB = 1
startC = 1
end if
startB = 1
startC = 1
do a = startA, endA
MPI_ALLREDUCE(Local_CAD_Index,CAD_Index,2**nchoosek,MPI_INTEGER,MPI_SUM,MPI_COMM_WORLD,ierr)
call generate_IPO(PO(a,1:N),N,IPO1,nchoosek)
do b = startB, factorial
call generate_IPO(PO(b,1:N),N,IPO2,nchoosek)
do c = startC, factorial
call generate_IPO(PO(c,1:N),N,IPO3,nchoosek)
call generate_B2_vector(IPO1 + IPO2 + IPO3,nchoosek,SPO)
B10_Rep = 0
do i = 0,nchoosek-1
B10_Rep = B10_Rep + SPO(nchoosek-i)*(2**i)
end do
Local_CAD_Index(B10_Rep+1) = Local_CAD_Index(B10_Rep+1) + 1
end do
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end do
end do
call MPI_ALLREDUCE(Local_CAD_Index,CAD_Index,2**nchoosek,MPI_INTEGER,MPI_SUM,MPI_COMM_WORLD,ierr)
end subroutine three_inventory
Integer Function NC2(N)
Integer, intent(in) :: N
NC2 = Nfact(N)/(2*Nfact(N-2))
end function NC2
Integer Function Nfact(N)
Integer :: N
Integer i,nfct
nfct = 1
do i = 1,N-1
nfct = nfct*(i+1)
end do
Nfact = nfct
end function Nfact
Integer Function str2int(nn)
character nn
Integer :: N
if (nn == ’1’) then
N = 1
elseif (nn == ’2’) then
N = 2
elseif (nn == ’3’) then
N = 3
elseif (nn == ’4’) then
N = 4
elseif (nn == ’5’) then
N = 5
elseif (nn == ’6’) then
N = 6
elseif (nn == ’7’) then
N = 7
elseif (nn == ’8’) then
N = 8
elseif (nn == ’9’) then
N = 9
end if
str2int = N
end function str2int
Subroutine generate_B2_vector(IPO,nchoosek,b2_vect)
Integer, Intent(in) :: nchoosek
Integer, Dimension(1:nchoosek) :: IPO
Integer, Dimension(1:nchoosek), Intent(out) :: b2_vect
Integer :: i,j
do i = 1,nchoosek
if (IPO(i) > 0) then
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b2_vect(i) = 1
else
b2_vect(i) = 0
end if
end do
end subroutine generate_B2_vector
Subroutine generate_IPO(tPO,N,IPO_vector,nchoosek)
Integer, Intent(in) :: N,nchoosek
Integer, Dimension(1:N), Intent(in) :: tPO
Integer, Dimension(1:nchoosek),Intent(out) :: IPO_vector
Integer :: i,j,k,m,count
Integer :: ranki,rankj
count = 1
do i=1,N
do k =1,N
if (tPO(k) == i) then
ranki=k
exit
end if
end do
do j = i+1,N
do m = 1,N
if (tPO(m) == j) then
rankj = m
exit
end if
end do
if (ranki < rankj) then
IPO_vector(count) = 1
else
IPO_vector(count) = -1
end if
count = count + 1
end do
end do
end subroutine generate_IPO
Appendix I: MATLABCode for Computing Tran-
sitivity Score
function Transitive_Scores = tscores(N)
clear global TCADS;
clear global CADS;
global TCADS;
global CADS;
length = nchoosek(N,2)
for k=1:2^nchoosek(N,2)
CADS_TScore(k)=0;
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end
generate_TCADS(N);
generate_CADS(N);
for i=1:2^nchoosek(N,2)
for j=1:factorial(N)
CADS(:,i)
TCADS(:,j)
temp_score = dot(CADS(:,i),TCADS(:,j))/length
if temp_score > CADS_TScore(i)
CADS_TScore(i) = temp_score;
end
end
’CAD OF 2^(N CHOOSE 2)’;
i;
end
csvwrite(’7_TScores.txt’, CADS_TScore’);
CADS_TScore’
end
function Generate_Transitive_CADS = generate_TCADS(N)
global TCADS;
IPO = perms(1:N);
for i=1:factorial(N)
count=1;
for j=1:N-1
for a=1:N
if IPO(i,a)==j
rankj=a;
a=N;
end
end
for k=j+1:N
for b=1:N
if IPO(i,b)==k
rankk=b;
b=N;
end
end
if rankj < rankk
TCADS(count,i) = 1;
else
TCADS(count,i) = -1;
end
count = count + 1;
end
end
end
end
function Generate_All_CADS = generate_CADS(N)
global CADS;
recur_CAD(nchoosek(N,2));
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end
function Recursive_CADS = recur_CAD(length)
global CADS;
if length==1
CADS=[-1 1];
else
recur_CAD(length-1);
for i=1:2^(length-1)
temp(i) = -1;
temp(i+2^(length-1)) = 1;
end
CADS = [CADS CADS];
CADS = [temp ; CADS];
end
end
Appendix J: SPlus Code for Inventory Output
Analysis
x <- scan("CADFreqV5A5.txt")
x <- sort(x)
f <- rep(0,1000)
f[1] <- x[1]
c <- rep(0,1000)
j <- 1
for(i in 1:length(x))
{ if(x[i] == f[j])
c[j] <- c[j] + 1
else
{ j <- j + 1
f[j] <- x[i]
c[j] <- c[j] + 1
}
}
Appendix K: MATLAB Code for Borda–Perron
Manipulability Comparison
function TestManipulation = main(V,A,S)
clear global OutputMatrixB;
global OutputMatrixB;
clear global OutputMatrixP;
global OutputMatrixP;
clear global MScoresB;
global MScoresB;
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clear global MScoresP;
global MScoresP;
for a=8:A
N = num2str(a);
file_name = strcat(’IPOS’,N);
input_file = strcat(file_name, ’.txt’);
IPOs = load(input_file);
for v=2:V
clear PO;
for i=1:a
for j=1:v
PO(i,j) = 0;
end
end
for i=1:1
for j=1:S
MScoresB(i,j) = 0;
MScoresP(i,j) = 0;
end
end
for i=1:S
for j=1:v
PO(:,j) = IPOs(ceil(factorial(a)*rand),:)’;
end
ManipulationScoreB(PO,IPOs,a,v,i);
ManipulationScoreP(PO,IPOs,a,v,i);
end
OutputMatrixB(v-1,a-2) = mean(MScoresB);
OutputMatrixP(v-1,a-2) = mean(MScoresP);
end
end
csvwrite(’Manipulation_OutputMatrixB.txt’, OutputMatrixB);
csvwrite(’Manipulation_OutputMatrixP.txt’, OutputMatrixP);
end
function PartialSum = BordaOutcome(PO,V,A)
for i=1:A
PartialSum(i) = 0;
end
for i=1:V
for j=1:A
for k=1:A
if (PO(j,i) == k)
PartialSum(k) = PartialSum(k) + A - (j - 1);
break;
end
end
end
end
end
function OrderedSum = Sort(PartialSum,A)
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OrderedSum = PartialSum;
for i=1:A-1
for j=1:A-i
if (OrderedSum(j+1) > OrderedSum(j))
temp = OrderedSum(j);
OrderedSum(j) = OrderedSum(j+1);
OrderedSum(j+1) = temp;
end
end
end
end
function Manipulation = ManipulationScoreB(PO,IPOs,A,V,index)
global MScoresB;
MaxScore = 0;
MaxIndex = 0;
Multiplicity = 0;
PartialSum = BordaOutcome(PO,V,A);
OrderedSum = Sort(PartialSum,A);
for i=1:A
Tpoints(i) = 0;
end
for i=1:factorial(A)
MaxScore = 0;
Multiplicity = 0;
Outcome = OrderedSum + IPOs(i,:);
for j=1:A
if (Outcome(j) > MaxScore)
MaxScore = Outcome(j);
end
end
for j=1:A
if (Outcome(j) == MaxScore)
Multiplicity = Multiplicity + 1;
end
end
for j=1:A
if (Outcome(j) == MaxScore)
if (Tpoints(j) < 1/Multiplicity)
Tpoints(j) = 1/Multiplicity;
end
end
end
end
for i=1:A
MScoresB(index) = MScoresB(index) + Tpoints(i);
end
MScoresB(index) = (MScoresB(index)-1)/(A-1);
end
function Manipulation = ManipulationScoreP(PO,IPOs,A,V,index)
global MScoresP;
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MaxScore = 0;
MaxIndex = 0;
Multiplicity = 0;
for i=1:A
for j=1:A
PartialPerronMatrix(i,j) = 0;
end
end
for i=1:V
PartialPerronMatrix = PartialPerronMatrix + GenerateMatrixPO(PO(:,i),A);
end
PartialPerronMatrix;
for i=1:A
Tpoints(i) = 0;
end
for i=1:factorial(A)
MaxScore = 0;
Multiplicity = 0;
OutcomeMatrix = PartialPerronMatrix + GenerateMatrixPO(IPOs(i,:),A);
[V, D] = eig(OutcomeMatrix);
OutcomeVector = abs(V(:,A));
for j=1:A
if (OutcomeVector(j) > MaxScore)
MaxScore = OutcomeVector(j);
end
end
for j=1:A
if (OutcomeVector(j) == MaxScore)
Multiplicity = Multiplicity + 1;
end
end
for j=1:A
if (OutcomeVector(j) == MaxScore)
if (Tpoints(j) < 1/Multiplicity)
Tpoints(j) = 1/Multiplicity;
end
end
end
end
for i=1:A
MScoresP(index) = MScoresP(index) + Tpoints(i);
end
MScoresP(index) = (MScoresP(index)-1)/(A-1);
end
function MatrixPO = GenerateMatrixPO(PO,A)
for a=1:A
for b=1:A
MatrixPO(a,b) = 0;
end
end
for i=1:A
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for k=1:A
if PO(k)==i
ranki=k;
break;
end
end
for j=i+1:A
for m=1:A
if PO(m)==j
rankj=m;
break;
end
end
if ranki < rankj
MatrixPO(i,j) = 1;
MatrixPO(j,i) = 0;
else
MatrixPO(j,i) = 1;
MatrixPO(i,j) = 0;
end
end
end
end
Appendix L: MATLABCode for Standard–Exponential
Convex Borda Manipulation Scores
function WeightedBordaManipScore = main(V,A,S,D)
clear global TotalScore;
global TotalScore
clear global MScores;
global MScores;
clear global output_file;
global output_file;
output_file = fopen(strcat(num2str(V),num2str(A),’_ConvexBordaManipScore.txt’),’w’);
for i=1:V
for j=1:A
for k = 1:(1/D+1)
MScores(i,j,k) = 0;
end
end
end
for i=1:A
PartialSum(i) = 0;
OrderedSum(i) = 0;
end
for voters = 2:V
for alts = 3:A
IPOs = load(strcat(strcat(’IPOS’,num2str(alts)), ’.txt’));
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for i = 1:(1/D+1)
TotalScore(i) = 0;
end
for j = 1:S
for k=1:voters
PO(:,k) = IPOs(ceil(factorial(alts)*rand),:)’;
end
delta = 0;
for i = 1:(1/D+1)
PartialSum = BordaOutcome(PO,voters,alts,delta);
OrderedSum = Sort(PartialSum,alts);
TotalScore(i) = TotalScore(i) + GetM(OrderedSum,IPOs,voters,alts,delta);
delta = delta + D;
MScores(voters,alts,i) = TotalScore(i)/S;
end
end
clear PO;
end
end
delta = 0;
fprintf(output_file, ’Sample Size ...... = %1.0f \n’, S);
fprintf(output_file, ’Total Voters ..... = %1.0f \n’, V);
fprintf(output_file, ’Total Alternatives = %1.0f \n’, A);
fprintf(output_file, ’Step Size ........ = %1.5f \n’, D);
fprintf(output_file, ’Exponent Base .... = e \n\n’);
fprintf(output_file, ’Delta V A ManipulationScore \n’);
for i = 1:(1/D+1)
for voters = 2:V
for alts = 3:A
fprintf(output_file, ’%1.3f %1.0f %1.0f %1.5f \n’,
delta, voters, alts, MScores(voters, alts, i));
end
end
delta = delta + D;
end
end
function PartialSum = BordaOutcome(PO,V,A,delta)
for i=1:A
StandardSum(i) = 0;
end
for i=1:V
for j=1:A
for k=1:A
if (PO(j,i) == k)
StandardSum(k) = StandardSum(k) + A - (j-1);
break;
end
end
end
end
for i=1:A
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ExponSum(i) = 0;
end
for i=1:V
for j=1:A
for k=1:A
if (PO(j,i) == k)
ExponSum(k) = ExponSum(k) + exp(A+1-j);
break;
end
end
end
end
for i=1:A
PartialSum(i) = (1-delta)*StandardSum(i) + delta*ExponSum(i);
end
end
function OrderedSum = Sort(PartialSum,A)
OrderedSum = PartialSum;
for i=1:A-1
for j=1:A-i
if (OrderedSum(j+1) > OrderedSum(j))
temp = OrderedSum(j);
OrderedSum(j) = OrderedSum(j+1);
OrderedSum(j+1) = temp;
end
end
end
end
function Manipulation = GetM(OrderedSum,IPOs,V,A,delta)
global MScores;
MaxScore = 0;
MaxIndex = 0;
Multiplicity = 0;
Manipulation = 0;
for i=1:A
Tpoints(i) = 0;
end
for i=1:factorial(A)
MaxScore = 0;
Multiplicity = 0;
Outcome = OrderedSum + BordaOutcome(IPOs(i,:)’,1,A,delta);
for j=1:A
if (Outcome(j) > MaxScore)
MaxScore = Outcome(j);
end
end
for j=1:A
if (Outcome(j) == MaxScore)
Multiplicity = Multiplicity + 1;
end
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end
for j=1:A
if (Outcome(j) == MaxScore)
if (Tpoints(j) < 1/Multiplicity)
Tpoints(j) = 1/Multiplicity;
end
end
end
end
for i=1:A
Manipulation = Manipulation + Tpoints(i);
end
Manipulation = (Manipulation-1)/(A-1);
end
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